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We estimate the public-private sector pay gap for 27 European countries, using the
2008 EU SILC. The coefficients of conditional (on personal and job characteristics)
public sector controls give a first impression on wage differences, while
decompositions into explained and unexplained components (also accounting for
selectivity) allow for a more complete analysis, which helps to identify possible
causes of the gap. Regional patterns exist. Separate subsample decompositions
based on age, education, gender and occupation, provide interesting insight
regarding the pay structure of each country. Quantile decomposition analyses show
that the public-private pay gap is, generally, negatively related to income quantiles.
JEL classification: J31, J45, J48
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Wage determination in the public sector has been a matter of considerable interest,
given that the competitive paradigm and a number of other wage determination
models are not directly applicable or appropriate. This hiatus has energized attempts
to establish (i) how wages in the public sector are determined and (ii) what possible
differences there may exist between wage determination outcomes in the public and
private sectors and why.
In the context of the EU, this issue attracts additional interest, given that its various
integration policies involve convergence not only across Member States (MSs) but
also within each MS. In Programme Countries (PCs) which have had to resort to
Troika support (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Portugal), a major issue has been the
public-private pay gap: In part, this is due to the fact that public sector wages amount
to a large portion of national government expenditures which themselves need to be
reduced. In addition, public servants have been easy targets, precisely because (at least
in the short-run) the competitive paradigm does not apply and governments can often
proceed to cut public sector wages unilaterally. But, more relevant to this endeavour,
public sector pay has attracted attention because it is often thought to be excessive,
particularly when working conditions and retirement provisions are taken into account.
In PCs within the euro area, competitiveness is often an issue and strengthening it may
require internal devaluations and wage decreases which can start in the public sector by
edict, but may spread to and further encourage private sector wage reductions.2013 Christofides and Michael; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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convergence and the welfare of MSs. Official documents often refer to the unconditional
gap, implicitly assuming that none of it can be explained by measurable productivity
characteristics. Yet, one of the most successful empirical regularities in labour economics
is the Mincer equation which conditions earnings on variables such as education and
experience, among others. Applied to public and private sector earnings, they often reduce
the unconditional wage differential substantially and should shift the focus of attention to
the unexplained wage gap. The unexplained gap varies considerably between countries;
despite important contributions, this cross-sectional dimension has not been adequately
explored and charted for a large enough number of countries.
This paper provides estimates of the public-private sector pay gap for 27 European
countries, using comparable data and estimation methods for all countries. We establish
what part of the gap can be explained by individual and job characteristics using Oaxaca
and Ransom (1994), henceforth OR, decompositions. This is a necessary first step to a
better understanding of why the unexplained gap varies across countries and how it might
be further reduced once country-specific characteristics and policies are understood and
taken into account. Cross-country comparisons complement country-specific examinations
of ‘natural experiments’; well-designed experiments are not always available or conclusive.
For this analysis, we use micro data from the 2008 European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions1 (EU SILC), which includes information on 27 countries: all 2008
MSs except France and Malta, plus Iceland and Norway. We address definitional issues,
creating (given the possibilities offered by the data) samples of public servants and private
sector employees which are comparable across countries. We study the influence of
important factors (e.g. education and experience) on the wage determination processes
of sectors (public and private) and countries, isolating the unexplained public-private
wage gap in each country. In doing so, we also consider relevant sample selection issues.
We also consider how the public-private wage gap may vary along country wage
distributions.
We define the public sector as NACE Code L, which is "Public Administration and
defence, compulsory social security" (Public Administration for short). The remaining
NACE categories are defined as private and we conduct most of our analysis in these
terms. However, in light of the fact that, in some countries, some portion of the health
and education sectors is public, we pay special attention to NACE categories M (Education),
and N (Health, social work). There is no public sector indicator in the data and it is,
therefore, impossible to define and analyse the broader public sector with precision. In
our sample, for most countries, the health and education sectors have a pay disadvantage,
suggesting that policy concern should be focused on Public Administration relative to the
remaining sectors.
In the sections that follow, we briefly review the international literature with emphasis on
cross-country studies (Section 2), and comment on the sample construction protocol and
data features (Section 3). In Section 4, we present unconditional differentials, the coeffi-
cients of conditional public sector controls and OR decompositions into the explained
and unexplained components of the gap. For these models we also present quantile ana-
lyses of the relation between the public-private pay gap and the level of the hourly wage.
For the OR approach, we explore the ‘offered’ wage gap that would prevail in the popula-
tion at large following selection correction. We summarise our findings in Section 5.
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The literature on public- private wage differentials has been quite extensive. This section
does not aim to describe the current state of art. Rather, we refer to some of the classic
papers that have informed our work and make more extensive reference to papers which
examine a cross section of countries. A thorough review of the literature on public sector
labour markets until 1998 can be found in Gregory and Borland (1999).
The first studies in this area are mainly for the United States, Canada and the United
Kingdom. For Europe, a number of studies chart and explain the public-private sector
pay gap. These include (Petersen et al. 1990) for Denmark, Hartog and Oosterbeek
(1993) and Van Ophem (1993) for the Netherlands, Dustmann and Van Soest (1998)
and Melly (2005) for Germany, Christofides and Pashardes (2002) for Cyprus, Bargain
and Melly (2008) for France, Adamchik and Bedi (2000) and Fallaris (2004) for transition
economies, and numerous authors for the UK (e.g. Rees and Shah (1995), Blackaby et al.
(1999), and Heitmueller (2006)).
There are very few cross country studies that attempt to explain the public-private
wage gap. Lucifora and Meurs (2006), measure and decompose the gap for three different
countries (Italy, France and the UK), but using different data sources for each country.
They use quantile regression to analyse the distribution of wages across sectors and
conclude that wage differentials depend on the choice of quantile of the wage distribution;
this conclusion also varies by gender and skill. In France and Italy the public-private
sector wage gap is smaller than in the UK. This is related to the more decentralized
wage setting in the UK; in France and Italy collective bargaining and union presence
result in lower returns to productive characteristics.
Giordano et al. (2011) use EU SILC data from 2004-2007 for ten EU countries. They
report results based on OLS regressions with a dummy variable for the public sector
and also comment extensively on the institutional settings of each country. They find a
conditional pay differential in favour of the public sector, especially for Spain, Greece,
Ireland, Portugal and Italy (compared to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and
Slovenia). In separate regression analyses, the gap is generally higher for women at the
low end of the wage distribution. In terms of institutional settings, the authors observe
some positive correlation between low-gap countries and more decentralized wage setting.
However, they do not see any relation between the size of the gap and union power.
Our work extends this paper in a number of directions. Since a public sector indicator is
not available, we focus on a narrow definition of the public sector (Public Administration),
while also reporting results for Education and Health. In unreported results, Giordano et al.
(2011) allow the coefficients on characteristics to vary across sectors, while we report
separate equations and make the calculation of the unexplained component of OR
decompositions our central point because this is the puzzle that needs to be explored
(Mincer equations explain the balance). We estimate and report quantiles because
separate OLS regressions by income level may be open to selection biases. We deal
with selection into the paid work sample that we analyse from the larger sample that
includes the unemployed and non-participants, reporting and analysing not only
‘measured’ public-private wage gaps but those that would prevail in the larger, random,
sample – the ‘offered ‘gap. Finally, we cover 27 rather than 10 countries, thereby
opening the possibility of further study of the cross-country features that may explain the
public-private pay gap.
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institutional background of the labour market under study, since it is believed that
these institutional, country, characteristics influence labour market outcomes and the
gap between public and private sector wages. Such characteristics include wage setting
procedures, the level of centralization of the public sector, differences in recruitment
procedures, union power, minimum wage laws and coverage, the wage indexation system,
employment protection legislation, etc.
From a methodological point of view, a variety of approaches have been used to study
wage differentials. Some studies, using micro data, tried to check for the existence of a
positive wage premium in the public sector by including a dummy variable in the wage
equation, indicating whether an employee belonged to the public or private sector – see
Gregory and Borland (1999). Other studies applied decomposition methods, often that of
OR. The main idea was to account, not only for differences in the intercept between the
two sectors (the dummy variable approach), but also to take into account differences in
the returns of worker characteristics and job attributes between the two sectors. A third
wave of studies tried to take into account the selection effect caused by unobserved
individual characteristics (which determines entry into the samples studied) and correct
the bias using the two-step Heckman selection methods.
Gyourko and Tracy (1988) estimate a more general selection model in which workers
decide not only the sector (public or private), but also whether they will become a
member of a trade union or not. Christofides and Pashardes (2002) use a Bivariate Probit
to account for selection into sector (public, private) and type of employment (paid,
self-employment) and then examine public-private wage gaps for paid employees.
Other attempts to take account of selection into the public sector, or at least explain the
incidence of employment by sector, include Anghel et al. (2011), Glinskaya and Lokshin
(2007), Heitmueller (2006), Kanellopoulos (1997), and Van der Gaag and Vijverberg
(1988), to name but a few. Central to these efforts is the availability of instruments that
explain the choice of sector but are not relevant to the wage determination process.
Thus, Christofides and Pashardes (2002) use life insurance expenditures as a proxy for
risk aversion and whether other household members are employed in the public sector
as a proxy for the ‘transaction’ costs involved in gaining employment in the public sector.
In general, these efforts are circumscribed by the availability of suitable instruments in the
data set used and the EU SILC is not particularly rich in such instruments: Parental
education, for example (a possible determinant of parental employment in the public
sector), is only available if parents live in the same household. A number of size-related
house variables, while available, are not clearly related to the decision to seek employment
in the public sector. We have, therefore, not attempted to control for selection by sector.
Finally, recent studies use quantile regression techniques to examine differences in the
wage distribution among the two sectors (Poterba and Rueben (1994)), while Machado
and Mata (2005) propose a quantile regression decomposition technique, which allows
decomposition at different quantiles. The Machado and Mata conditional quantile
regression technique combines a decomposition procedure and a bootstrap approach.
In particular, they analyse the changes in the wage density among the two groups. They
decompose differences in the quantiles of the two groups into a portion which is due
to the coefficients and one which is due to the covariates. Chernozhukov et al. (2013)
break new ground, but Nõpo (2008), Melly (2005), and Van Kerm (2012) have also
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ment of a variety of decomposition methods and related issues. We explore the possibility
of analysing the public-private wage gap by the wage level in Section 4.4.3. Data issues
We use micro data from the Cross-Sectional European Union Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions (EU SILC) for 2008, which includes information on 27 countries; 25
MSs except France and Malta plus Iceland and Norway. The EU SILC data are col-
lected by Eurostat, via the national statistical agencies, following common definitions
and methodologies for all countries. Information is provided on the individual’s per-
sonal and family characteristics, the number of children and child-minding arrange-
ments, working status and type of employment, occupation, annual income and hours
of work, the industry of employment, and income from non-employment. In the main
body of the paper, we focus on the hourly wages defined as Annual Income/(Number
of Months Worked times 4.2 times weekly hours of work). In Section 4.3.5, we check
the sensitivity of our results to the use of monthly data, defined as Annual Income/
Number of Months Worked. The natural logarithm of wages is always used on the left-
hand side and, for small differences, ln wage gaps can be viewed as percentage
differences.
Since our main objective here is to compare public and private sector pay, it is im-
portant to select samples of individuals in jobs in the two sectors which are comparable
along a number of dimensions. With that in mind, we exclude from the working sam-
ple: (i) individuals working part-time or below 30 hours per week, (ii) students, (iii)
those retired or disabled, and (iv) soldiers. We do not exclude individuals who worked
for part of the year (e.g. new starts and individuals who retired at some point through
the year). We do exclude individuals below 25 and above 60 in order to avoid the pos-
sibly unusual patterns of work at the beginning and end of careers. It is also advisable
to exclude the self-employed and family workers because it is widely felt that, in a num-
ber of countries, self-employment incomes are not truthfully reported. The total sample
includes the unemployed and the inactive and endogenous selection behaviour into
paid work (the sample of public and private employees that we analyse) is taken into
account for the OR decompositions.
Beyond these restrictions, it was also necessary to ‘clean’ the data. Observations with miss-
ing information on important issues such as labour force status, employment status, the
number of months worked, weekly hours worked, and annual income had to be dropped.
Finally, we dropped, on a country-by-country basis, observations containing inconsistencies
or possible mistakes, such as zero or very low income for those working. With similar rea-
sons in mind, we dropped observations with hourly wages below the 1st percentile of the
hourly wage distribution and above 3 times the 99th percentile.
In the final sample, we have 171,108 individuals (roughly equally divided between men
and women) in 27 countries of whom 137,085 were full time employees, 12,284 were un-
employed and 21,739 were inactive – see Table 3 in the Appendix. The number of observa-
tions ranges from 2,524 in Iceland to 15,688 in Italy. The number of observations in the
public sector is smallest in Norway (125) and largest in Italy (1229). Breakdowns for key
variables are available on request.
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by NACE industry. We observe significant variation among the 27 countries. The lowest
average hourly wages are found in Bulgaria (€1.58) and Romania (€1.95) and the highest
in Norway (€26.79) and Iceland (€25.26). This incredibly large range, unadjusted though it
is for local cost of living, taxes, and other local peculiarities and amenities, points to the
immense incentives for migration that already exist and will intensify as flows are
liberalised further. In the public sector, the hourly wages in Bulgaria and Romania are
€1.81 and €2.68 respectively, while in Norway and Iceland they are €24.63 and €27.89.
From Table 4 in the Appendix one can also infer the unconditional wage levels in and im-
plied wage differentials between the bolded public (NACE L) and components of the pri-
vate sector in the 27 countries. Conditional public-private wage differentials are examined
in the next section.
4. Econometric analysis
4.1 Preliminaries
Before proceeding to the main part of our econometric analysis, it is important to
pause on the matter of the definition of the public sector alluded to in the introduction
and, at the same time, to offer some insights into the structure of wages in the broader
public sector in Europe. An easy method to explore this issue that also has some inter-
esting properties2 is to introduce controls for NACE L, M and N and Other in stand-
ard Mincer equations, estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), for each country
separately. The controls for industry (see Table 4 in the Appendix for definitions) and
other categorical variables are entered so that all group coefficients are normalised to
zero - though we do not discuss the individual contribution of regressors to the unex-
plained component (see Jann (2008) and Yun (2005)), this is a ‘best practice’ procedure
that avoids identification errors when the unexplained component (which includes the
intercept) is decomposed and helps us assess the results immediately below more easily.
The wage equations also include seven controls for age, three controls for education
(L=less than secondary, S=secondary, and H=higher education), two for gender, two for
temporary or permanent forms of employment, and four for occupations3, as well as a
constant. Table 5 in the Appendix provides full results, with the coefficients on the im-
portant industry controls summarised in Figure 1.
As shown in Figure 1, wages differ substantially across the three sectors and the 27
countries. Coefficients, expressed as deviations from the grand mean, for the Education
sector are either not significantly different from zero (at the 10% level, unless otherwise
stated), as in Lithuania, Slovenia, Finland, Austria, Luxembourg, and Germany, or are
negative for most countries with six exceptions, viz. Cyprus, Spain, Ireland, Greece,
Portugal and Poland. Wages for the education sector in Cyprus are particularly high
compared to the grand mean of zero. Along the same lines, the coefficient for the Health
sector is positive and significantly different from zero only for Italy. In all other countries,
it is either not significantly different from zero or significantly negative – see Figure 1. By
contrast, the Public Administration sector coefficient is either above zero or insignificant
for all countries. Among the highest coefficients for this sector relative to the industry
grand mean of each country are Hungary, Luxembourg, and Bulgaria. The graph for Other
Industries in Figure 1, shows the sum (times minus one) of the coefficients for NACE L,
M and N which, of course add up to zero across NACE L, M, N, and Other.
Note: Insignificant for AT, LT, CY, BE, FI, SI, DE, NO at a 10% level.
Note: Insignificant for LT, SI, FI, AT, LU, DE at a 10% level.
Note: Insignificant for LV, CY, EE, NL, SI, FI, NO, ES, PT, LU, IS  at a 10% level. 



























CY ES GR LU PT IE LV IT FI SI CZ HU PL LT RO UK NL DK AT SK EE IS BE DE NO SE BG
All other industries (excluding PA, Health, Education)
Figure 1 OLS Coefficients in Hourly Wage Equations for Public Administration, Health, Education
and Other (all remaining industries).
Christofides and Michael IZA Journal of European Labor Studies 2013, 2:15 Page 7 of 53
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/15Figure 1 shows that it is the Public Administration sector that merits particular atten-
tion; this keeping in mind that, without a public sector identifier, observations in educa-
tion and health cannot be reliably classified into the public and private sector. Table 6
in the Appendix and Figure 2 provide the OLS deviation from the grand mean for
Public Administration, when Other now includes Education and Health. Luxembourg,
Cyprus, and Greece have coefficients of the order of 10%, with countries all the way
down the graph to Bulgaria having coefficients which are significantly positive. Begin-
ning with Bulgaria and for the next six countries in Figure 2, the coefficient on Public
Administration is not significantly different from zero, while for Belgium, Germany and
Norway, it is significantly lower than zero. The complete regression results are
presented in Table 6 in the Appendix. The range of public-private sector ln wage gaps
(0.121 for Luxembourg to -0.038 for Norway) is substantial and indicates quite different
attitudes and practices across the 27 countries.
In order to examine the nature of these gaps across the 27 countries more closely, we
turn now to the OR decompositions which are based on separate regressions for the






LU CY GR HU PT LV ES CZ RO IE UK IT IS SK PL NL DK BG SE EE LT FI AT SI BE DE NO
Public Administration
Figure 2 OLS Coefficients in ln Hourly Wage Equations for Public Administration.
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coefficients must be the same across sectors and offering the possibility to arrive at an
unexplained component which is based on differences in coefficients beyond those on
the constant terms.4.2 OR decompositions
In light of the discussion above, we use the OR decomposition4 to investigate the ln
hourly wage gap between the public sector (defined as NACE=L) and the private sector
(defined as all other NACE categories). We estimate the total ln wage differential and
decompose it into (i) the part explained by individual characteristics (age, education,
and gender) and job attributes (type of contract and occupation), (ii) the public sector
advantage (unexplained higher returns to the various characteristics for public sector
employees) and (iii) the private sector disadvantage (unexplained lower returns to indi-
vidual characteristics for private sector employees). Items (ii) plus (iii) constitute the
unexplained component. In effect, these are equations such as those in Table 6 in the
Appendix but without the public sector dummy and estimated separately by sector;
they are not reported to conserve space. We present normalised coefficients. Our main
results concern hourly wages and the working sample.
Table 1 presents, in summary form, the results of the decompositions both in ln wage
points (top part for each country) and in percentages (bottom part). The bolded row is
the ln wage gap between the public and private sector (the left-hand side of the equation
in endnote 4). There is a significant (three stars indicate the 1% level, two stars the 5%
level and one star the 10% level) hourly wage differential between the public and private
sector for almost all countries. The size of the total ln wage gap ranges from essentially
zero in Belgium and Norway to 0.38 in Latvia. A number of interesting patterns exist. The
lowest gaps are to be found in Belgium and in Scandinavian countries; indeed, in Norway
the gap is actually negative (though not significantly different from zero). Gaps in excess
of 30% are to be found in Greece, Luxembourg and Latvia. PCs have gaps around 30%,
with the exception of Ireland where the gap is 0.157%.
As noted earlier, it is the unexplained public-private wage gap that is of possible pol-
icy interest. Table 1 suggests that a substantial part of the conditional gap is actually
explained. Indeed, in the case of Belgium, Germany and Norway, the personal and job
characteristics of public sector employees are so good that they would justify more pay
and, by implication, the unexplained components are negative.5 Other countries, where
the explained component is larger than the unexplained (though not as extreme cases
Table 1 OR Decompositions (ln hourly wage, full sample, public sector defined as NACE L=Public Administration)
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
HOURLY WAGE
public 2.847*** 2.842*** 0.428*** 2.538*** 1.539*** 2.829*** 3.211*** 1.399*** 2.536*** 2.933*** 2.507*** 1.389*** 3.180*** 3.235***
private 2.753*** 2.839*** 0.311*** 2.242*** 1.333*** 2.794*** 3.162*** 1.266*** 2.253*** 2.805*** 2.173*** 1.098*** 3.023*** 3.082***
difference 0.095*** 0.004 0.117*** 0.296*** 0.206*** 0.034*** 0.049** 0.133*** 0.283*** 0.128*** 0.334*** 0.291*** 0.157*** 0.153***
explained 0.092*** 0.036*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.001 0.111*** 0.151*** 0.115*** 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.061*** 0.066***
pub. adv. 0.003 −0.028** 0.027 0.176*** 0.108*** −0.045*** 0.046** 0.020 0.115*** 0.012 0.159*** 0.143*** 0.081*** 0.078**
pri. disadv. 0.000 −0.005** 0.002 0.023*** 0.007*** −0.007*** 0.002** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.008**
percent
explained 96.84% 900.00% 74.36% 32.77% 44.17% 255.88% 15.87% 83.46% 53.36% 89.84% 43.11% 45.70% 38.85% 43.14%
pub. adv.. 3.16% −700.00% 23.08% 59.46% 52.43% −132.35% 76.19% 15.04% 40.64% 9.38% 47.60% 49.14% 51.59% 50.98%
pri. disadv. 0.00% −125.00% 1.71% 7.77% 3.40% −20.59% 6.35% 0.75% 6.01% 0.78% 9.28% 4.81% 8.92% 5.23%
observ. 2,963 3,224 3,031 2,862 8,484 6,559 4,551 4,011 8,601 3,453 3,104 5,943 1,965 1,083
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
HOURLY WAGE
public 2.719*** 1.221*** 3.297*** 1.486*** 3.227*** 3.171*** 1.451*** 2.047*** 0.814*** 2.928*** 2.235*** 1.185*** 3.007***
private 2.489*** 1.062*** 2.962*** 1.106*** 3.092*** 3.200*** 1.178*** 1.770*** 0.520*** 2.858*** 2.009*** 1.043*** 2.909***
difference 0.230*** 0.159*** 0.335*** 0.380*** 0.134*** −0.029 0.273*** 0.277*** 0.294*** 0.070* 0.226*** 0.142*** 0.098***
explained 0.143*** 0.142*** 0.106*** 0.241*** 0.070*** 0.044*** 0.210*** 0.124*** 0.184*** 0.042* 0.225*** 0.063*** 0.001
pub. adv. 0.077*** 0.015 0.212*** 0.124*** 0.056*** −0.069*** 0.058*** 0.135*** 0.104*** 0.027 0.001 0.068*** 0.086***
priv. disadv. 0.010*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.008*** −0.004*** 0.005*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.011*** 0.011***
percent
explained 62.17% 89.31% 31.64% 63.42% 52.24% −152.00% 76.92% 44.77% 62.59% 60.00% 99.56% 44.37% 2.04%
pub. adv. 33.48% 9.43% 63.28% 32.63% 41.79% 238.00% 21.25% 48.74% 35.37% 38.57% 0.44% 47.89% 93.88%
pri. disadv. 4.35% 0.63% 5.07% 3.95% 5.97% 14.00% 1.83% 6.14% 2.04% 1.43% 0.00% 7.75% 4.08%
observ. 10,219 3,575 2,912 3,726 2,485 2,128 8,586 2,777 4,588 2,493 3,365 5,521 4,439
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Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and Slovenia. As the lower
half of Table 1 shows, in the case of Austria and Slovenia, the explained part reaches
96.84% and 99.56% of the total gap respectively and, in some other countries (Bulgaria,
Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, and Poland), the explained percentage is over 70%. While
eleven countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, Denmark and the UK) have explained components
which are lower than the unexplained components, the four PCs are all in this category,
suggesting that the Troika’s preoccupation with public pay reductions may be justified.
The UK is a country with a middling ln wage gap (9.8%) of which only 2.04% is
explained by personal and job characteristics.
Figure 3 summarises these findings visually. The explained component (bottom of
bars) is shown in very dark grey. The public sector advantage (middle of bars) is shown
in light grey and the private sector disadvantage (top of bars) is shown in medium grey.
The figure clearly shows the explained component which, in many countries, reduces
the size of the public-private wage gap puzzle substantially. The unexplained compo-
nent, the sum of the other two bars, is dominated by the public sector advantage. It is
this amount which should be the subject of policy interest.
A number of important policy issues are buried into the results of Table 1 and
Figure 3. These involve the contribution of age, education, gender, and occupation to
the decompositions and we now proceed to consider these in greater depth. Most of
these breakdowns are based on exogenous (age, gender) or largely predetermined in
2008 (occupation, education) decisions. We also examine the definitional issue of
hourly versus monthly wages. The differentiation of the public-private wage gap by
income level is examined through quantile analysis in Section 4.4.4.3 Sub-sample analysis
The explained part of the decompositions presented above can be broken down into the
contribution of each variable but, in light of the large number of variables and countries
involved, this exercise would not have yielded transparent results. Instead, and in light of
the exogeneity/predeterminateness noted earlier, we divide the sample into sub-groups of








LV LU GR CY RO HU ES PT PL IT SI CZ LT IE IS SK NL EE FI BG UK AT SE DK DE BE NO
Ln Hourly Wage
explained pub. adv. priv. disadv.
Figure 3 The OR decompositions in Table 1.
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As indicated in Figure 4, the ranking of countries by public-private pay gap changes
substantially once we condition on age. In addition, the distinction between the
explained and unexplained gap is important to keep in mind. Cyprus, for instance,
seems to have double the wage gap for older workers compared to younger ones (0.415
compared to 0.202 ln wage points). This might indicate that experience is valued more
in the public sector, compared to the private. Indeed, a higher proportion of the gap is
explained for older workers (0.173/0.415=0.42) than for the young (0.047/0.202=0.23) -
see Table 7 in the Appendix for full results. Slovenia also exhibits a much higher gap
for older workers, compared to the young. However, for Slovenia most of the gap is
explained, which suggests that among people aged 45 and over, public sector employees
are more qualified. Some other examples of countries with slightly higher gaps for the
older worker group are Austria, Finland, Ireland, Poland, and Slovakia.
On the other hand, there are countries where younger workers have a much higher
wage differential, compared to the older-employee group. Romania for example has a
wage differential of 0.363 ln wage points for younger employees, but only 0.178 for
older workers. Similarly, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Italy, Portugal and Luxembourg have
higher gaps for the young. In the case of ex USSR countries, this might reflect a need
to attract workers with new skills which might, at least soon after the breakdown of the
USSR, be in short supply.
This kind of information might identify possible problems with public sector payment
structures and identify structural reforms which might improve the efficiency of this sector.Note: The younger workers’ sample has insignificant wage differentials for BE, DE, DK, NO, and  
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Figure 4 The OR Hourly Wage Decompositions by Age Group.
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just pay scales but also cohort differences and other unmeasured characteristics.
4.3.2 By education
We also divide the sample into tertiary educated and non-tertiary educated individuals.
From Figure 5 and Table 8 in the Appendix, it is obvious that, in most countries, less
educated workers are compensated much more in the public sector than in the private
sector. Luxembourg for example, which has one of the highest ln wage differentials in
total sample estimates, has an insignificant wage differential for tertiary educated
employees, while for less educated individuals the differential is the highest among all
countries (0.542 ln wage points). This pattern also holds for the unexplained gaps. In
the case of Cyprus, the total gap for less educated workers is 0.428 ln wage points com-
pared to 0.084 points for tertiary education graduates and the unexplained gap follows
a similar pattern. This information is of critical importance to current efforts to reform
the labour market in Cyprus. Indeed, it would appear that Troika-backed changes to
the public-private wage gap in Cyprus may have stressed reductions to wages at the
high end of the earnings distribution unduly.
Exceptions to the general pattern discussed above are found in the five new MSs,
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, where public-private wage gap is
higher for tertiary education graduates both in total and at the unexplained level. As in
the case of age, this may reflect shortages that may have emerged following the collapse
of the USSR.Note: For the non-tertiary educated, the wage differential is insignificant at the 10% level for SE, LT, EE, and 
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Figure 5 OR Hourly Wage Decompositions by Education.
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Wage differentials by gender are widely discussed in the literature – for an extensive
treatment for OECD countries see Anghel et al. (2011). In the context of the public-
private sector, some literature has reported evidence for higher public-private sector
wage gaps for females than for males. In our estimates (Figure 6 and Table 9 in the Ap-
pendix), we obtain mixed results. The public-private sector ln wage gap is higher by
more than 0.10 ln wage points for women in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, countries
that in Christofides et al. (2013) were found to have relatively large gender wage gaps.
A higher public-private sector pay gap for females may indicate considerable private
sector disadvantage and/or progressive public sector pay policies but these effects do
not fully remove the disadvantage that women have in these countries. Giordano et al.
(2011) find that the pay gap is generally higher for women at the low end of the wage
distribution. However, more than half of the 27 countries have higher public-private
sector gaps for males. Low pay differences between men and women (about 0. 02 ln
wage points) are observed in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and
Slovakia, and high ones in Iceland, Poland, and Sweden (0.124, 0.073 and 0.099 respect-
ively) - Figure 6 and Table 9 in the Appendix.
4.3.4 Occupation: clerks
We have singled out clerks for special attention because they are relatively low-paid
and, in principle, similar across sectors; they are also a relatively numerous category of
public sector employees. Results appear in Figure 7 and Table 10 in the Appendix.
When clerks only are considered, the public-private ln wage differential is generally
lower than in the total sample and insignificant for about half of the countries.Note: For the male employees, the wage differentials are insignificant at a 10% level of significance level for DE, 
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Figure 6 OR Hourly Wage Decompositions by Gender.
Note: Insignificant wage differential for IS, NO, EE, DE, BG, SE, BE, SI, DK, FI, RO, AT, LT, PL, and 
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Figure 7 OR Hourly Wage Decompositions for Clerks.
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Luxembourg, Latvia, Hungary and Portugal. These countries also have among the highest
total-sample public-private ln wage gaps. Cyprus and Romania have a significantly lower
public-private ln wage differential for clerks compared to the one estimated for the total
sample. This may reflect more heterogeneous occupations in the private sector of these
countries, a fact which may not be adequately captured by the available occupation
controls. For example, in Romania, an important part of the private sector is related to
low-paid primary occupations (around 30% of total employment, the highest in the EU)
which are not present in the public sector. We may then find a large wage gap in the total
sample whereas, in the clerks’ sample, the gap may be insignificant if the remuneration of
clerks in the two sectors is comparable. Unfortunately, we do not have enough observa-
tions in the sample to explore this issue further.
Though the total public-private ln wage gap is generally lower for clerks, for the
majority of countries the gap is largely unexplained except for Italy and (partly) Spain,
Greece and Portugal. This might reflect a larger degree of educational mismatch in
these countries, i.e. educated people take unskilled jobs due to the inability to find a
skilled job with a satisfactory wage. The X variables will then be comparable across
sectors, placing a larger burden on the unexplained component.
4.3.5 Monthly wage decompositions
Because hours of work may differ in a systematic way between the public and private
sectors, it is possible that public-private wage gaps may look different if based on
hourly rates than if based on monthly rates. Accordingly, we check our main findings,
which are generally based on hourly rates, using monthly wages.
Hours in the private sector are higher and, with the exception of a handful of countries,
the public-private ln wage gap is generally higher when using hourly wages. This holds
with both the OLS results (see Figure 14 in the Appendix and results in Table 11 in the
Appendix) and the OR decomposition in Figure 8 (Table 12 in the Appendix). The rank-
ing of countries is approximately the same, though, as that of hourly wage estimates. Note
that Belgium and Norway have a slightly negative total public-private ln wage differential,
significant at the 10% level; for these countries, the hourly gap was insignificant.
The proportion of the total gap that is explained is generally lower when hourly rates
are used than is the case with the monthly data examined here (see Figures 3 and 8).
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derstanding of the gap, increases the unexplained public-private sector gap. This di-
mension of private sector disadvantage is brought to the surface, justifying the use of
hourly rates.
Slovenia continues to have the entire public-private gap explained by characteristics and
some countries (Finland and Bulgaria) now join that case. Germany continues to have an
explained component which is larger than the total, suggesting that rewards in the public
sector should either be larger or that there are features of public sector rewards, such as
working conditions and retirement provisions, that are not captured by the data and
which bring the remuneration package in the two sectors into closer alignment.4.4 Quantile analysis
An unexplained public-private pay gap in a country raises questions about productive
efficiency, the extent to which unwarranted public sector settlements might spill over
into the private sector and affect competitiveness, and about public finances. It also
raises questions about equity as most analysts would consider that, taking all factors
into account, overall remuneration (including retirement and other working provisions)
should be similar in the two sectors. Thus, a constant pay gap across income levels
would raise questions along the lines just noted.
A number of further issues arise when the public-private pay gap is not constant
across income levels. A large starting pay gap would attract more competent young en-
trants into the public service but also exacerbate queuing phenomena and early-career
turnover. For a given overall pay gap, it would also mean that the public-private differ-
ential diminishes or becomes negative at higher levels of income, encouraging turnover
at the more senior level or, worse still, discouragement and underperformance. On the
other hand, steep profiles (relative to those prevailing in the private sector) may fail to
attract liquidity-constrained but competent young entrants and those that do enter the
public service may never wish to leave.
4.4.1 Coefficient on public (specification of Table 6 in the Appendix)
We begin by examining whether the coefficient for Public in the wage equation varies
across quantiles6. Table 2 summarises our findings when the conditioning equation is
that which lies behind Table 6 in the Appendix. We provide estimates only for the coef-
ficient on Public, for five quantiles: the 10th, 25th, 50th (median), 75th and the 90th.
Table 2 Quantile regression results for the coefficient on Public
Countries/
Quantiles






AT 0.051 0.040 0.007 −0.009 −0.027 0.003 0.709 2,963
BE −0.005 −0.021 −0.046*** −0.056** −0.072*** −0.034** 0.140 3,224
BG 0.084** 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.031 0.298 3,031
CY 0.416*** 0.302*** 0.197*** 0.067*** −0.009 0.210*** 0.000 2,862
CZ 0.134*** 0.143*** 0.150*** 0.109*** 0.084*** 0.119*** 0.072 8,484
DE 0.150*** 0.023* −0.063*** −0.138*** −0.195*** −0.055*** 0.000 6,559
DK 0.100*** 0.040* 0.025 0.027 0.006 0.048** 0.026 4,551
EE 0.103** 0.074** 0.030 −0.038 −0.122** 0.023 0.003 4,011
ES 0.226*** 0.230*** 0.144*** 0.091*** 0.053** 0.141*** 0.000 8,601
FI 0.083*** 0.064** 0.020 −0.018 −0.052** 0.014 0.006 3,453
GR 0.190*** 0.263*** 0.239*** 0.194*** 0.127*** 0.203*** 0.002 3,104
HU 0.147*** 0.155*** 0.165*** 0.191*** 0.144*** 0.165*** 0.566 5,943
IE 0.224*** 0.215*** 0.073*** 0.037 −0.015 0.102*** 0.000 1,965
IS 0.142** 0.084 0.076** 0.046 0.067 0.092** 0.844 1,083
IT 0.181*** 0.147*** 0.108*** 0.064*** 0.001 0.094*** 0.000 10,219
LT 0.086** 0.021 −0.001 0.051 −0.026 0.017 0.033 3,575
LU 0.264*** 0.366*** 0.277*** 0.234*** 0.166*** 0.241*** 0.011 2,912
LV 0.270*** 0.237*** 0.133*** 0.074* 0.011 0.148*** 0.000 3,726
NL 0.173*** 0.129*** 0.094*** 0.035 −0.055** 0.067*** 0.000 2,485
NO 0.042 −0.026 −0.038* −0.131*** −0.213*** −0.075*** 0.000 2,128
PL 0.163*** 0.117*** 0.091*** 0.051** −0.052* 0.068*** 0.000 8,586
PT 0.237*** 0.242*** 0.151*** 0.088* 0.051 0.158*** 0.000 2,777
RO 0.035 0.114*** 0.099*** 0.133*** 0.123** 0.114*** 0.700 4,588
SE 0.117*** 0.009 0.001 −0.063 −0.042 0.029 0.011 2,493
SI 0.103** −0.006 −0.009 0.006 −0.043 0.001 0.040 3,365
SK 0.137*** 0.115*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.030 0.084*** 0.001 5,521
UK 0.181*** 0.149*** 0.107*** 0.061*** 0.054 0.101*** 0.003 4,439
Notes: (i) The OLS coefficients for Public differ from those in Table 6 in the Appendix because coefficients are not
normalised (Other is omitted). The reference group is the private sector, age 25–29, lower education, female, and in
occupation d. (ii) Bootstrap standard errors are based on 50 repetitions. (iii) Job permanency information is not available
for Denmark and the UK. (iv) F-tests are for the joint equality of coefficients across the five quantiles.
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Public in the five quantiles rejects equality in 21 out of the 27 cases. The joint equality
of coefficients cannot be rejected for Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, Iceland, and
Romania.
A number of patterns emerge. The relationship between the pay gap and the hourly
wage quantiles is generally negative. This finding is also observed in previous studies, such
as Mueller (1998) for Canada and Lucifora and Meurs (2006) for Italy, France and the UK.
As shown in Table 2, interesting points of detail can be discerned. Many countries have
individually significant and positive gaps at the lowest quantiles, which decline and turn
insignificant or even negative at higher quantiles (Cyprus, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Latvia,
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Denmark, and the UK). For Bulgaria, Finland, Lithuania,
Sweden, Slovenia, and Denmark, the coefficient on Public is individually insignificant at
all quantiles except at the lowest part of the distribution, where the public sector is shown
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countries, where a positive and individually significant gap for all quantiles is higher in
the middle of the distribution at q25 to q50 (Czech Republic, Spain, Greece, Hungary,
Luxembourg, and Portugal). Belgium and Norway have negative or insignificant gaps
for all quantiles, which become more negative and individually significantly different
from zero at the highest quantiles. Austria has individually insignificant public sector
coefficients at all points of the distribution. In the case of Austria and Belgium, the F test
does not reject the equality of coefficients. Finally, Romania is the only country where the
gap is smallest and insignificant at the lowest quantile, while positive and significant at
higher quantiles; however, the F test accepts coefficient equality. Table 2 provides further
details. It is not clear from our 2008 EU SILC snapshot whether these profiles are steady
state ones or whether they are the result of cohort and other historical effects.
4.4.2 Quantile decompositions
In addition to the quantile analysis of the coefficient for Public administration presented
above, we decompose differences in the distributions of the public and private sector based
on Machato and Mata (2005) and Chernozukhov et al. (2013)7. Similar to the Oaxaca
decomposition, this method can decompose the difference between the entire public and
private wage distributions into a part attributed to the effects of characteristics (explained)
and a part due to differences in coefficients or differences in the wage structure of the
two groups (unexplained). To construct the conditional distribution of wages for private
employees and hence, the counterfactual distribution necessary for the decomposition, we
use linear quantile regression as in the previous section. We present the decomposition
results estimated for nine quantiles (0.1 to 0.9) in Figures 9 and 108.
The analysis described in this section is performed: (a) for each country separately in
Figure 9 and (b) for two groups of countries: the four PCs and all remaining countries
in the sample (Figure 10). In order to make Figure 9 more readable, the results are
presented in groups which are roughly based on the patterns involved. The total and
unexplained components are shown on the left and right-hand graphs respectively. In
Groups A and B are countries with high total differences across quantiles and with a
lower difference observed at the highest quantiles. The pattern for Group A (Cyprus,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway and the Netherlands) is roughly one of a straight nega-
tively sloped line, while that for Group B (Greece, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom
and Luxembourg) generally involves more complexity, with high differences between the
0.2 and 0.5 quantiles. In these two groups we observe all PCs (Cyprus and Ireland in
group A and Greece and Portugal in Group B). We also see other Southern European
countries, such as Italy and Spain, in groups A and B. Luxembourg, which is among the
highest pay-gap countries, also has the biggest difference in distributions across
quantiles (the difference at q20 is 0.51 ln wage points but only 0.07 at q90). However,
we observe some low pay gap countries to also exhibit high differences across quantiles.
For example, Germany has a maximum difference of 0.29 at q10 and a minimum one
of -0.19 at q90. A similar comment holds for Norway and the United Kingdom.
Note that, the unexplained difference in distributions follows a similar pattern for
most countries but at slightly lower levels than the total gap, with a couple of excep-
tions. For Cyprus the unexplained part is especially high and equals the total gap at
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Figure 9 Decomposition of the differences in distributions – separate country estimates.
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Figure 10 Decomposition for the differences in the distributions– Programme country group.
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UK across most of our approaches.
Groups C and D are countries with generally lower differences across quantiles; a lower
gap at the higher relative to the low quantiles is still in evidence. Group C countries have
somewhat higher gaps in levels compared to Group D, though they exhibit the same pat-
tern. Note that countries in group C (Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, and Latvia) are all ex-USSR countries and new MSs, while countries in Group D
(Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, Iceland, and Finland) include Scandinavian and
other central European countries.
Finally, in Group E we present countries with a total difference which is roughly
constant across quantiles (e.g. Latvia), or with a positive difference and a positive slope
across quantiles (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania). Note that, these are also all ex-
USSR countries and new MSs. For Latvia, despite the constant difference across
quantiles, the difference in coefficients (unexplained) is much higher at the lowest
quantiles.
When the programme and non-programme countries are grouped (Figure 10), it is
noteworthy that the unexplained component for the former lies uniformly above that
for the latter – see the right-hand graph in Figure 10.4.5 Correcting for selection
As noted in Section 3, a number of exclusions (e.g. part-timers, students, retired,
disabled, soldiers and the self-employed) were imposed in order to focus on a sample
of paid employees which is reasonably homogeneous and which could, in principle, be
located in either the public or the private sector. The selected sample includes the un-
employed and those inactive. It is conceivable that unobservables may steer individuals
into the sample of paid employees and that these unobservables may not be independent
of unobservables in the wage equations. This may be particularly the case with individuals
who may, in time, withdraw from the labour force for family-formation reasons but will,
until then, underperform in terms of earnings. In addition, some individuals with a strong
preference for leisure, perhaps because of independent means, may exclude themselves
from employment by specifying reservation wages which are unrealistically high. It would,
therefore, be useful to check the sample of paid employees used so far for selection.
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tion as well. We do so using the Maximum Likelihood (ML) version of the Heckman
correction in Stata. In the implied first-stage Probit equation we include, in addition to
the age, education, and gender variables that appear in the standard wage equations,
marital status, the number of children (childn), whether paid childcare is used (paidc),
whether childcare is provided by relatives (relativec), and net exogenous income (exog
inc=rents, dividends and unincorporated profits). These are reasonable instruments, in
addition to the non-linearity of Probit, for determining paid employment.
Table 13 in the Appendix9 parallels Table 6 in the Appendix which was discussed
earlier. The explanatory variables behave as expected in the Mincer equations. The
extent to which the selection correction is warranted can be judged from the signifi-
cance of the correlation coefficient between the error term in the Probit and the wage
equation, which Stata reports in the row ‘athrho’ of Table 13 in the Appendix. In one
third of the 27 countries this correlation is not significantly different from zero,
suggesting that selection is not important10. But in the large majority of the countries it
is significantly positive or negative and sometimes quite large in absolute value. It is,
therefore, necessary to take selection into account and to explore how different the co-
efficients on ‘Public’ (always defined as NACE=L) are between Tables 6 and 13 of the
Appendix.
Table 14 in the Appendix reports the Probit equation, estimated as part of the ML
approach which produces Table 13 in the Appendix, where unity indicates paid
employment, and zero unemployment or inactivity. Early and late stages of life are as-
sociated with reduced propensity, while high levels of education with increased likeli-
hood of paid employment (relative to the unemployed and inactive). Males are more
prone to paid employment, marital status has mixed coefficients, and those with more
children generally have lower probability of paid employment. Other variables of spe-
cial interest generally behave as expected. The availability of child care by relatives is
associated with higher probability of paid work in almost all countries. Paid child care
is associated with a lower probability of paid work in about two thirds of the countries
studied. The ambiguity of sign may indicate some endogeneity. Finally, outside income
is clearly associated with reduced proclivity for paid work.
Figure 11, reports the coefficients on the dummy variable signifying the public sector.
The dark bars correspond to Figure 2 and the numbers in Table 6 in the Appendix,
while the light grey ones correspond to the selection-corrected ones in Table 13 in the
Appendix. As can be seen, the coefficients on the variable Public are very similar across
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Figure 11 Coefficient on Public without selection (Table 6 in the Appendix) and with selection
(Table 13 in the Appendix).
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selection must be taken into account, since the evidence in Table 13 in the Appendix
suggests that it is a statistically important force. The modest differences between the
dark and light grey bars in Figure 11 may not tell the whole story in that quantitatively
important effects may materialise with respect to the coefficients on other variables,
affecting OR decompositions.
The selection approach adopted above is clean but potentially limited in scope. One can
imagine a more complete approach where, having excluded soldiers, students and the
retired, observations are selected into self or paid employment and, if the latter, into the
public or private sector with controls in the wage equation for part-time status and
disability. However, this procedure is too ambitious given the availability of observations11.
As a check on the selection procedure first reported, we have carried out OR
decompositions, having run a first-stage Probit equation that sorts observations into
paid employment (out of the entire sample that also includes the unemployed and
the inactive). The estimate of the inverse Mills ratio λ^i , i = (P, R), from this equation
was included as a variable with an estimated coefficient θ^P in the public and θ^R in
the private sector wage equations that feed into the OR decompositions12. The Probit
specification (Table 16 in the Appendix) is the same as that outlined in the ML, system,
procedure above but, of course, the results are not identical to those in Table 14 in the
Appendix due to the difference in estimation procedure adopted (Heckit rather than ML).
Note that, although the number of observations in Tables 14 and 16 in the Appendix are
generally the same, the small differences in the number of observations for Denmark,
Iceland and Romania arise because the Stata routine for Probit drops the childcare variable
for these three countries where there is almost no cross-sectional variation. The implied
decompositions appear in Table 15 in the Appendix and in Figure 12, similar to Figure 3.
The difference in the selection terms (item four on the right-hand-side of the equation
in endnote 12) is significant at the 10% level in 10 of the 27 countries (Cyprus, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and the UK). Figures 3
and 12 have the same general setup; however, Figure 3 decomposes the ‘measured’ and
Figure 12 the ‘offered’ wage gap. The ranking of countries by the size of the offered gapNotes: The inverse Mills ratio is significant at the 10% significance level for CY, DE,DK, ES,FI, NL, PL, 
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Figure 12 The OR Decomposition of the Offered Gap.
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positions, especially for Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Latvia, Slovenia, and Sweden.
Only a fraction of the offered gap in Figure 12 is explained by characteristics and it is
the unexplained gap that should be the subject of policy initiatives.
Figure 13 compares the unexplained gaps in the ‘measured’ and ‘offered’ public-
private ln wage gaps of the 27 countries; the former are obtained from the sum of rows
5 and 6 in Table 1, while the latter are based on the sum of rows 8 and 9 in Table 15 in
the Appendix. Luxembourg, Cyprus, Greece and Hungary have the highest unexplained
component, while Belgium, Germany and Norway have the lowest unexplained com-
ponents; indeed, the latter are negative, suggesting that productive characteristics
would justify higher public-private wage gaps in these countries. In the case of
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Sweden, large differences between the unadjusted
and selection-adjusted unexplained gaps can be discerned, but it should be remem-
bered that, for these countries, the inverse Mills expressions are not significant. In
the case of Denmark, where the inverse Mills expression is significant, there is also
a change of sign in the (small) unexplained component.5. Conclusions
Using comparable data drawn from the 2008 cross-sectional EU SILC and a common
econometric protocol, this paper provides estimates of the public-private sector hourly
pay gap for 27 European countries based on a narrow definition of the public sector
(NACE L= Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security).
In the context of OLS, we first present conditional (age, education, gender, job
permanency, and occupation are controlled for) public-private sector pay gaps using
a ‘Public’ categorical variable. Complexity is added by exploring the extent to which
the public-private pay gap is not constant (as implied in Table 6 in the Appendix) but
varies with the quantiles of the hourly wage. Allowing for complexity in a different
direction, we check and correct for endogenous selection and its effects on the esti-
mated pay gaps. We find that Luxembourg, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, and Portugal are
at the top of the public-private pay gap country list, while Austria, Slovenia, Belgium,
Germany and Norway have the lowest gaps. This holds without and with selection
corrections. In the quantile analysis, the modal pattern is a negative one, where the
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Figure 13 Unexplained components without (dark grey) and with selection (light grey).
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yet shed light; further work is pending.
More complexity is also achieved by allowing the coefficients on all the controls men-
tioned above to differ by sector, making possible decompositions along the lines of Oaxaca
and Ransom (1994) into the explained and unexplained components of the gap (with and
without selection corrections). Without selection, the OR decompositions focus on the
‘measured’ gap while, with selection, it is possible to report the ‘offered’ gap that would have
prevailed in the population at large (rather than in the selected sample) and its decomposi-
tions. In either case, the Mincer equations explain substantial portions of the gap, in some
countries completely or even suggesting ‘underpayment’ of public sector employees, given
their characteristics. This fact alone suggests that the unconditional approach that is typic-
ally followed in official EU and other documents can be very misleading. It is a strength of
these decompositions that they allow analysts to focus on the unexplained component of
the public-private pay gap, the concept on which policy should focus.
When separate regressions in the two sectors are allowed for, the measured pay gap is
topped by Latvia, Luxembourg, Greece, Cyprus, and Romania, while Sweden, Denmark,
Germany, Belgium and Norway are at the bottom of the list. Luxembourg and Cyprus have
the highest unexplained gaps, while those for Germany, Belgium and Norway are actually
negative. These gaps are examined separately for (i) young and old employees, (ii) those
with tertiary and no tertiary education, (iii) males and females and (iv) clerks relative to
the whole sample. These breakdowns provide interesting insight into the pay structure of
the public sector. For instance, Luxembourg has high unexplained components for both
young and old, those without tertiary education, males and females and clerks but not
especially so for those with tertiary education. A variety of patterns can be identified
across countries and rankings can change substantially. In general, less educated workers
tend to have larger unexplained gaps; a variety of patterns exist across countries with
respect to the other breakdowns that were carried out. Clerks were examined because it is
a populous category that may be similar across the two sectors. The results suggest that
the pay gap is lower for clerks than in general but that this gap is largely unexplained.
Quantile estimations which allow for decompositions support the decreasing relation-
ship with the hourly wage reported earlier in the context of the intercept-shift model. In
addition, this pattern generally holds for the unexplained component. These results
suggest that the public-private pay gap is highest at low hourly wages. We noted earlier
that it is highest for the less educated and, in some countries, for women. At one level, this
picture suggests that the public sector is a vehicle for greater equality. But, at another
level, this propensity is coming under closer scrutiny, particularly in programme countries
which need to enhance their competitiveness, suggesting that social policy should be more
targeted and separate from the remuneration practices of the public sector.
Having established in a number of alternative ways the public-private sector ln wage
gaps in the 27 countries, it is of course important to explore why these patterns exist. The
structure of the labour market might affect the size and nature of the gap (percentage of
employees in primary sector, percentage in self-employment, percentage of employees in
small firms, etc.). Other factors related to wage setting procedures, entry procedures,
the level of centralization of the public sector, minimum wages and wage indexation
might also affect the public-private wage gap. Exploring the reasons for the cross-
sectional differences is an enormous task, beyond the scope of the current paper.
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1 Eurostat has no responsibility for the results and conclusions of this paper.
2 See Elder et al. (2010).
3 The four occupation dummies are: a =legislators, senior officials, managers (11-13);
b = professionals (21-24), technicians and associate professionals (31-34), skilled agricul-
tural and fishery workers (61), and armed forces (01); c = clerks (41-42), and service and
shop sales workers (51 – 52); and d = craft and related trade workers (71-74), plant and
machine operators and assemblers (81-83), and elementary occupations (91-93).
4 A simple decomposition among two groups Public (P) and Private (R) can be




――― ¼ XP−XRð ÞbP þ XR bP−bRð Þ
where the left-hand side is the difference between the average natural logarithms of hourly
wages in group P and group R, and bP and bR correspond to estimated coefficients from
separate OLS regression equations for groups P and R respectively. The first right-hand
side term describes the portion of the wage-gap which is explained by differences in
personal characteristics and job attributes included in X, while the second term is the
unexplained part of the log wage difference which corresponds to differences in
returns to individual characteristics. The size of the explained part depends on bP and





――― ¼ XP−XRð ÞbN þ XP bP−bNð Þ þ XR bN−bRð Þ
where bN is a non-discriminatory structure estimated using a pooled regression – the
no-sector dummy option in Stata is used for the implementation of this decomposition,
see Jann (2008). The first term is now the explained part, the second the public sector
advantage and the third term the private sector disadvantage.
5 In the case of Belgium and Germany the public-private sector gap is still positive
but could have been larger, given the superior measurable characteristics of public
sector employees. In the case of Norway where public sector employees earn less than
their private sector equivalents, the pay gap is actually negative (-0.029) and the
explained gap positive (0.044); this suggests that a public-private sector pay gap of
approximately 7% would have been justified. The unexplained component is -0.073
(the sum of the negative public sector advantage and the also negative private sector
disadvantage). The large and unusual percentage changes in the lower part of the
table reflect these circumstances.













This non-differentiable function is minimized using linear programming techniques.Standard errors are calculated using the bootstrap (50 repetitions).
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and that of the public Fw(P/P) is decomposed as follows:
Fw P=Pð Þ−Fw R=Rð Þ ¼ Fw P=Pð Þ−Fw R=Pð Þ
 þ Fw R=Pð Þ−Fw R=Rð Þ
 
;
Where Fw(R/P) is the counterfactual distribution that would have prevailed for public
employees if they faced the private wage schedule. This distribution is constructed by
integrating the conditional distribution of wages for the private sector with respect to
the distribution of characteristics for the public sector. This quantity is well defined if
the support of the private sector’s characteristics includes the support of the public
sector characteristics. The conditional distribution is estimated using linear quantile
regression (100 regressions are estimated). Bootstrap standard errors are estimated
using 50 repetitions.
8 Due to the large volume of estimation results, we do not provide the full decomposition
estimates from the quantile regression analysis. Stata routine cdeco was used for the
estimation.
9 The total number of observations (including the unemployed and inactive) in Table
13 in the Appendix differs somewhat from those in Table 3 in the Appendix because
some observations were lost when data on important explanatory variables (such as
occupation and industry) were missing for some individuals in the sample.
10 A positive (negative) correlation suggests that an unobservable entering the Probit
equation through the error term affects selection into the paid employee sample in the
same (in the opposite) direction that it affects hourly wages through the error term in
the wage equation.
11 The papers by Kanellopoulos (1997), Heitmueller (2006), Van der Gaag and
Vijverberg (1988) and Glinskaya and Lokshin (2007), as well as those noted earlier,
explore selection in to the public sector.




――― ¼ XP−XRð ÞbN þ XP bP−bNð Þ þ XR bN−bRð Þ þ θ^P λ^P−θ^Rλ^R
 
where the b terms indicate estimates of relevant coefficients on the explanatory variables
X in the wage equations and overbars indicate means. The subscript N refers to the
non-discriminatory structure which is normally based on the combined public and
private sector regression in each country. It is a matter of preference and purpose how
the decomposition results are presented. The left-hand side of the above equation
refers to the ‘measured’ public-private gap in the paid worker sample. But since this
procedure corrects for selection bias, it is possible to refer to the public-private pay
gap that would have prevailed in the population at large (which includes in addition to
the paid workers, the unemployed and the inactive). This is referred to as the ‘offered’
pay gap. Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) note the inherent complexity involved in decom-
posing the fourth term in the above equation into further explained and unexplained
components. The estimates below transfer the entire last term to the left hand side
(this is one of the options discussed in the literature) to define the ‘offered’ gap. These
estimates complement and extend the information supplied by the earlier estimates of
the ‘measured’ pay gap.
Christofides and Michael IZA Journal of European Labor Studies 2013, 2:15 Page 26 of 53
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/15Appendix
This appendix provides full results on the figures and issues raised in the main body of
the paper. Three broad categories are relevant, viz. Descriptive statistics, OLS regres-
sions and Sample decompositions and selection corrections.Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the number of individuals that were full time employees, unemployed
and inactive in 27 countries. Table 4 presents the unconditional mean hourly wage by
country and by NACE industry.OLS regressions
Table 5 provides full results, with the coefficients on the important industry controls
summarised in Figure 1. Table 6 provides the OLS deviation from the grand mean for
Public Administration, when Other now includes Education and Health - see also Figure 2.Table 3 Number of observations by labour force status
Country Full- time employees Unemployed Total inactive Total
Austria (AT) 3,130 236 687 4,053
Belgium (BE) 3,292 503 724 4,519
Bulgaria (BG) 3,249 637 193 4,079
Cyprus (CY) 2,865 98 544 3,507
Czech Rep (CZ) 8,494 412 790 9,696
Germany (DE) 6,641 945 1,258 8,844
Denmark (DK) 4,718 108 122 4,948
Estonia (EE) 4,061 199 349 4,609
Spain (ES) 8,704 1,207 2,355 12,266
Finland (FI) 7,062 650 566 8,278
Greece (GR) 3,113 383 1,070 4,566
Hungary (HU) 6,062 701 959 7,722
Ireland (IE) 2,017 314 848 3,179
Iceland (IS) 2,385 9 130 2,524
Italy (IT) 10,228 1,344 4,116 15,688
Lithuania (LT) 3,602 278 220 4,100
Luxembourg (LU) 2,953 207 702 3,862
Latvia (LV) 3,727 338 418 4,483
Netherlands (NL) 5,241 90 1,172 6,503
Norway (NO) 4,331 78 123 4,532
Poland (PL) 8,666 1,027 1,505 11,198
Portugal (PT) 2,831 307 483 3,621
Romania (RO) 4,693 179 919 5,791
Sweden (SE) 5,146 270 104 5,520
Slovenia (SI) 9,847 1,144 461 11,452
Slovakia (SK) 5,574 445 193 6,212
United Kingdom (UK) 4,453 175 728 5,356
Total 137,085 12,284 21,739 171,108
Table 4 Hourly mean wage in euro by industry (NACE categories)
Country A+B C+D+E F G H I J K L M N O+P+Q Total
AT 11.66 16.86 16.16 16.80 12.16 16.38 23.34 19.70 18.70 20.81 16.10 16.19 17.44
BE 16.05 18.68 15.75 17.30 13.19 17.30 24.63 19.51 18.29 18.39 17.70 17.78 18.33
BG 1.15 1.67 1.66 1.44 1.46 1.69 2.39 1.74 1.81 1.38 1.26 1.35 1.58
CY 10.90 10.18 11.23 8.96 7.97 12.99 16.84 11.02 13.98 19.64 13.99 6.49 11.70
CZ 3.37 4.12 4.06 3.71 3.24 4.48 5.56 5.12 4.99 4.35 4.03 3.89 4.18
DE 12.23 20.20 14.59 15.66 10.21 17.32 24.18 19.08 17.73 18.85 16.76 17.13 18.21
DK 17.54 24.77 23.78 23.82 19.16 24.59 33.45 28.31 26.04 25.54 22.40 25.12 24.95
EE 3.44 3.75 5.38 3.84 2.94 4.82 7.13 5.07 4.54 3.61 3.69 3.47 4.16
ES 7.58 10.70 9.14 8.72 8.13 10.96 16.31 10.52 13.77 16.01 12.74 8.49 11.13
FI 13.60 20.31 16.00 17.96 13.53 17.65 23.64 19.73 19.81 19.43 16.17 16.53 18.34
GR 5.73 10.33 7.90 8.36 7.34 12.90 13.94 10.59 13.52 14.75 11.46 8.94 10.63
HU 2.82 3.37 2.84 2.99 2.78 3.72 5.56 4.00 4.65 4.02 3.41 3.74 3.56
IE 17.04 23.15 21.07 18.60 14.97 22.64 35.02 25.49 26.19 29.62 23.89 21.31 23.96
IS 20.39 24.56 21.49 22.16 18.02 27.42 35.24 28.76 27.89 23.04 23.95 23.19 25.31
IT 9.72 12.89 11.01 11.67 10.00 13.89 19.98 13.55 16.07 14.46 16.42 11.70 13.58
LT 2.61 3.39 4.11 3.03 1.95 3.66 5.31 4.01 3.87 4.03 3.08 3.01 3.48
LU 17.10 24.34 13.39 14.51 11.77 24.78 33.97 21.43 29.65 30.81 23.43 33.37 23.46
LV 2.83 3.55 3.87 3.18 2.45 4.12 7.62 5.08 5.21 3.96 4.22 3.71 3.92
NL 21.34 24.32 20.48 21.67 16.21 21.31 30.60 25.85 26.16 24.72 24.95 22.60 24.23
NO 20.32 29.76 25.24 25.35 18.06 27.39 36.43 30.07 24.63 25.15 23.80 24.67 26.79
PL 3.28 3.87 3.29 3.11 2.80 4.10 6.46 4.13 4.82 4.77 3.64 3.47 3.91
PT 4.72 6.08 5.61 5.71 4.77 8.38 15.18 7.27 8.85 12.31 8.78 5.53 7.38
RO 1.49 1.82 2.05 1.77 1.33 2.01 2.76 2.22 2.68 2.14 2.07 1.79 1.95
SE 18.08 20.38 19.44 19.47 13.60 18.80 32.06 21.66 20.46 17.10 17.55 18.07 19.56
SI 7.15 7.70 7.89 7.76 6.42 8.28 12.03 9.40 10.24 10.58 9.12 9.07 8.55
SK 2.73 3.17 3.16 2.79 2.38 3.31 4.06 3.58 3.52 3.00 2.75 2.94 3.15
UK 13.90 21.05 20.90 17.30 18.51 20.25 31.26 24.81 22.52 21.72 21.43 17.56 21.61
Total 6.12 10.03 9.56 9.43 7.35 10.86 20.22 14.91 13.22 12.51 13.10 11.82 11.39
Note: A= Agriculture, hunting, forestry; B= Fishing; C= Mining; D= Manufacturing; E= Electricity, gas, water; F=
Construction; G= Wholesale, retail trade, repair of vehicles, motorcycles, personal and household goods; H= Hotels,
restaurants; I= Transport, storage, communications; J= Financial intermediation; K= Real estate etc.; L= Public
Administration and defence, compulsory social security; M= Education; N= Health and social work; O+P+Q=
Remaining industries.
The Bolded column L=Public.
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Tables 7 to 16 and Figure 14 provide full results for the decompositions and sample se-
lection corrections that were discussed in the main body of the paper.
Table 13 parallels Table 6 which was discussed in Section 4. Table 14 reports the
Probit equation, estimated as part of the ML approach which produces Table 13, where
unity indicates paid employment, and zero unemployment or inactivity.
The implied decompositions appear in Table 15. The Probit specification (Table 16)
is the same as that outlined in the ML, system, procedure above but, of course, the
results are not identical to those in Table 14 due to the difference in estimation proce-
dure adopted (Heckit rather than ML).
Table 5 OLS Regression with Public (L), Education (M), Health (N) and Other (all other NACE categories) industries shown in the bolded rows
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
public 0.019 0.006 0.116*** 0.017 0.102*** -0.011 0.059*** 0.038* 0.054*** 0.006 0.104*** 0.141*** 0.042** 0.103***
education 0.004 -0.049*** -0.114*** 0.243*** -0.061*** -0.008 -0.031** -0.079*** 0.096*** 0.014 0.056* -0.048*** 0.094*** -0.114***
health -0.048*** -0.025* -0.138*** 0.002 -0.031*** -0.048*** -0.051*** 0.002 -0.016 -0.007 -0.036* -0.085*** -0.050** -0.037
other 0.024* 0.068*** 0.135*** -0.262*** -0.010 0.068*** 0.023** 0.039*** -0.133*** -0.012 -0.124*** -0.008 -0.085*** 0.048**
age25_29 -0.196*** -0.222*** -0.025 -0.237*** -0.051*** -0.222*** -0.201*** 0.076*** -0.175*** -0.119*** -0.338*** -0.130*** -0.282*** -0.201***
age30_34 -0.063*** -0.111*** -0.025 -0.099*** 0.020** -0.080*** -0.038*** 0.094*** -0.111*** -0.061*** -0.167*** -0.017 -0.149*** -0.113***
age35_39 -0.014 -0.009 0.019 -0.063*** 0.033*** 0.017 0.020* 0.049*** -0.011 -0.027* -0.052*** 0.031** 0.025 0.013
age40_44 -0.006 0.052*** 0.014 0.033* 0.002 0.034*** 0.059*** 0.033** 0.025** 0.023 0.056*** 0.024* 0.062*** 0.071***
age45_49 0.057*** 0.087*** 0.037* 0.068*** 0.024*** 0.083*** 0.068*** -0.016 0.064*** 0.046*** 0.138*** 0.004 0.146*** 0.097***
age50_54 0.078*** 0.099*** -0.004 0.145*** 0.002 0.102*** 0.043*** -0.053*** 0.095*** 0.062*** 0.193*** 0.060*** 0.088*** 0.059**
age55_60 0.144*** 0.104*** -0.015 0.152*** -0.030*** 0.065*** 0.050*** -0.183*** 0.114*** 0.076*** 0.171*** 0.028* 0.110*** 0.075***
edL -0.207*** -0.109*** -0.170*** -0.088*** -0.215*** -0.092*** -0.077*** -0.151*** -0.139*** -0.118*** -0.142*** -0.236*** -0.157*** -0.153***
edS 0.004 -0.014* -0.059*** -0.043*** -0.029*** -0.036*** -0.005 -0.017 0.001 -0.028*** -0.013 -0.065*** -0.014 -0.018
edH 0.203*** 0.123*** 0.229*** 0.131*** 0.243*** 0.128*** 0.081*** 0.169*** 0.138*** 0.146*** 0.156*** 0.301*** 0.171*** 0.171***
female -0.100*** -0.033*** -0.129*** -0.176*** -0.132*** -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.203*** -0.085*** -0.108*** -0.102*** -0.084*** -0.073*** -0.082***
male 0.100*** 0.033*** 0.129*** 0.176*** 0.132*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.203*** 0.085*** 0.108*** 0.102*** 0.084*** 0.073*** 0.082***
temporary -0.071*** -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.291*** -0.025*** -0.102*** na. -0.051 -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.087*** -0.079*** -0.038 -0.097***
permanent 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.070*** 0.291*** 0.025*** 0.102*** na. 0.051 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.079*** 0.038 0.097***
occup_d -0.189*** -0.145*** -0.113*** -0.305*** -0.162*** -0.231*** -0.125*** -0.148*** -0.161*** -0.173*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.170*** -0.128***
occup_c -0.063*** -0.071*** -0.141*** -0.149*** -0.120*** -0.087*** -0.120*** -0.236*** -0.126*** -0.160*** -0.122*** -0.170*** -0.152*** -0.093***
occup_b 0.102*** 0.047*** 0.065*** 0.099*** 0.067*** 0.116*** 0.067*** 0.147*** 0.090*** 0.028*** 0.020 0.088*** 0.139*** 0.082***
occup_a 0.150*** 0.169*** 0.189*** 0.355*** 0.216*** 0.202*** 0.178*** 0.237*** 0.198*** 0.305*** 0.304*** 0.283*** 0.183*** 0.140***
Constant 2.628*** 2.730*** 0.221*** 2.286*** 1.369*** 2.561*** 3.114*** 1.206*** 2.374*** 2.725*** 2.335*** 1.108*** 2.987*** 2.905***
Observations 2,963 3,224 3,031 2,862 8,484 6,559 4,551 4,011 8,601 3,453 3,104 5,943 1,965 1,083


















Table 5 OLS Regression with Public (L), Education (M), Health (N) and Other (all other NACE categories) industries shown in the bolded rows (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
public 0.056*** 0.018 0.137*** 0.097*** 0.072*** -0.026 0.061*** 0.078*** 0.107*** 0.060** -0.004 0.092*** 0.092***
education -0.035*** 0.068*** 0.002 -0.082*** -0.093*** -0.048*** 0.041*** 0.052*** -0.057*** -0.089*** 0.018 -0.059*** -0.062***
health 0.032*** -0.089*** -0.023 0.041 -0.002 -0.009 -0.105*** -0.019 -0.054*** -0.065*** -0.003 -0.066*** -0.041**
other -0.053*** 0.003 -0.117*** -0.056*** 0.022** 0.084*** 0.002 -0.111*** 0.004 0.094*** -0.011 0.033*** 0.010
age25_29 -0.205*** 0.011 -0.250*** 0.029 -0.264*** -0.151*** -0.163*** -0.219*** -0.137*** -0.187*** -0.159*** -0.049*** -0.180***
age30_34 -0.111*** 0.075*** -0.176*** 0.059** -0.113*** -0.071*** -0.089*** -0.112*** -0.023 -0.122*** -0.109*** -0.038*** 0.002
age35_39 -0.040*** -0.043** -0.091*** 0.015 0.007 0.024 0.027** -0.011 -0.003 -0.015 -0.008 0.026** 0.042**
age40_44 0.021*** 0.017 -0.005 -0.014 0.066*** 0.043** 0.067*** 0.032* 0.063*** 0.037* 0.031** 0.028** 0.043***
age45_49 0.077*** 0.008 0.085*** -0.004 0.087*** 0.080*** 0.054*** 0.082*** 0.040*** 0.080*** 0.094*** 0.024** 0.043***
age50_54 0.113*** -0.030 0.176*** -0.050** 0.108*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.104*** 0.041*** 0.099*** 0.079*** 0.026** 0.021
age55_60 0.145*** -0.038* 0.261*** -0.034 0.109*** 0.020 0.056*** 0.125*** 0.019 0.108*** 0.071*** -0.017 0.030*
edL -0.139*** -0.121*** -0.192*** -0.207*** -0.140*** -0.118*** -0.179*** -0.352*** -0.240*** -0.039* -0.246*** -0.209*** -0.204***
edS -0.001 -0.031* -0.015 -0.076*** -0.058*** -0.001 -0.032*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.021* -0.057*** -0.006 -0.011
edH 0.139*** 0.152*** 0.207*** 0.283*** 0.198*** 0.119*** 0.212*** 0.401*** 0.290*** 0.060*** 0.303*** 0.215*** 0.215***
female -0.076*** -0.187*** -0.088*** -0.170*** -0.063*** -0.088*** -0.116*** -0.135*** -0.091*** -0.084*** -0.076*** -0.114*** -0.082***
male 0.076*** 0.187*** 0.088*** 0.170*** 0.063*** 0.088*** 0.116*** 0.135*** 0.091*** 0.084*** 0.076*** 0.114*** 0.082***
temporary -0.115*** -0.049** -0.107*** -0.056* -0.057*** -0.062** -0.096*** -0.079*** -0.071*** -0.130*** -0.097*** -0.050*** na
permanent 0.115*** 0.049** 0.107*** 0.056* 0.057*** 0.062** 0.096*** 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.130*** 0.097*** 0.050*** na
occup_d -0.182*** -0.237*** -0.283*** -0.220*** -0.157*** -0.086*** -0.202*** -0.186*** -0.204*** -0.209*** -0.234*** -0.131*** -0.226***
occup_c -0.088*** -0.255*** -0.150*** -0.215*** -0.083*** -0.093*** -0.210*** -0.091*** -0.212*** -0.134*** -0.120*** -0.137*** -0.120***
occup_b 0.025** 0.170*** 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.128*** 0.177*** 0.104*** 0.037** 0.083*** 0.060*** 0.111***
occup_a 0.246*** 0.322*** 0.295*** 0.296*** 0.177*** 0.120*** 0.284*** 0.100 0.312*** 0.307*** 0.271*** 0.209*** 0.235***
Constant 2.528*** 1.004*** 3.042*** 1.176*** 2.943*** 3.017*** 1.185*** 2.046*** 0.530*** 2.721*** 2.000*** 0.995*** 2.819***
Observations 10,219 3,575 2,912 3,726 2,485 2,128 8,586 2,777 4,588 2,493 3,365 5,521 4,439


















Table 6 OLS Regressions with dummy variables for Public administration (bolded row) and Other; Other now includes all other NACE categories
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
public 0.002 -0.017** 0.015 0.105*** 0.060*** -0.028*** 0.024** 0.012 0.070*** 0.007 0.102*** 0.082*** 0.051*** 0.046**
other -0.002 0.017** -0.015 -0.105*** -0.060*** 0.028*** -0.024** -0.012 -0.070*** -0.007 -0.102*** -0.082*** -0.051*** -0.046**
age25_29 -0.195*** -0.215*** -0.008 -0.258*** -0.049*** -0.216*** -0.201*** 0.080*** -0.189*** -0.120*** -0.349*** -0.126*** -0.290*** -0.194***
age30_34 -0.063*** -0.106*** -0.014 -0.111*** 0.020** -0.080*** -0.038*** 0.097*** -0.124*** -0.062*** -0.172*** -0.015 -0.157*** -0.106***
age35_39 -0.013 -0.006 0.023 -0.072*** 0.032*** 0.018 0.021* 0.050*** -0.019* -0.027* -0.056*** 0.031** 0.022 0.021
age40_44 -0.005 0.052*** 0.010 0.030 0.002 0.035*** 0.060*** 0.032* 0.026*** 0.023* 0.059*** 0.023* 0.061*** 0.072***
age45_49 0.056*** 0.084*** 0.027 0.077*** 0.023** 0.082*** 0.069*** -0.016 0.070*** 0.046*** 0.138*** 0.003 0.149*** 0.092***
age50_54 0.077*** 0.093*** -0.008 0.157*** 0.001 0.100*** 0.042*** -0.055*** 0.108*** 0.063*** 0.199*** 0.058*** 0.096*** 0.048*
age55_60 0.143*** 0.099*** -0.030 0.176*** -0.030*** 0.060*** 0.047*** -0.188*** 0.128*** 0.077*** 0.182*** 0.025* 0.118*** 0.068**
edL -0.204*** -0.107*** -0.164*** -0.105*** -0.212*** -0.086*** -0.075*** -0.150*** -0.147*** -0.119*** -0.145*** -0.234*** -0.160*** -0.145***
edS 0.006 -0.009 -0.045*** -0.063*** -0.026*** -0.035*** -0.002 -0.014 -0.006 -0.029*** -0.017* -0.064*** -0.018 -0.013
edH 0.199*** 0.116*** 0.209*** 0.168*** 0.238*** 0.121*** 0.077*** 0.164*** 0.152*** 0.148*** 0.162*** 0.298*** 0.177*** 0.157***
female -0.104*** -0.045*** -0.142*** -0.152*** -0.135*** -0.102*** -0.099*** -0.209*** -0.073*** -0.107*** -0.098*** -0.090*** -0.066*** -0.092***
male 0.104*** 0.045*** 0.142*** 0.152*** 0.135*** 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.209*** 0.073*** 0.107*** 0.098*** 0.090*** 0.066*** 0.092***
temporary -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.278*** -0.026*** -0.106*** na -0.049 -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.087*** -0.080*** -0.025 -0.112***
permanent 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.278*** 0.026*** 0.106*** na 0.049 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.080*** 0.025 0.112***
occup_d -0.188*** -0.138*** -0.097*** -0.315*** -0.162*** -0.226*** -0.122*** -0.140*** -0.174*** -0.173*** -0.208*** -0.197*** -0.177*** -0.120***
occup_c -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.152*** -0.167*** -0.119*** -0.087*** -0.123*** -0.233*** -0.135*** -0.159*** -0.124*** -0.168*** -0.152*** -0.094***
occup_b 0.099*** 0.028*** 0.038* 0.172*** 0.063*** 0.104*** 0.066*** 0.132*** 0.128*** 0.029*** 0.041** 0.079*** 0.155*** 0.070***
occup_a 0.154*** 0.174*** 0.211*** 0.311*** 0.218*** 0.208*** 0.180*** 0.241*** 0.180*** 0.304*** 0.290*** 0.286*** 0.173*** 0.144***
Constant 2.643*** 2.749*** 0.330*** 2.184*** 1.413*** 2.582*** 3.152*** 1.243*** 2.345*** 2.723*** 2.330*** 1.170*** 2.982*** 2.962***
Observations 2,963 3,224 3,031 2,862 8,484 6,559 4,551 4,011 8,601 3,453 3,104 5,943 1,965 1,083


















Table 6 OLS Regressions with dummy variables for Public administration (bolded row) and Other; Other now includes all other NACE categories (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
public 0.047*** 0.009 0.121*** 0.074*** 0.033*** -0.038*** 0.034*** 0.079*** 0.057*** 0.015 0.001 0.042*** 0.050***
other -0.047*** -0.009 -0.121*** -0.074*** -0.033*** 0.038*** -0.034*** -0.079*** -0.057*** -0.015 -0.001 -0.042*** -0.050***
age25_29 -0.210*** 0.011 -0.251*** 0.026 -0.263*** -0.137*** -0.163*** -0.236*** -0.134*** -0.172*** -0.161*** -0.043*** -0.175***
age30_34 -0.115*** 0.077*** -0.178*** 0.056** -0.107*** -0.068*** -0.088*** -0.120*** -0.022 -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.035*** 0.004
age35_39 -0.042*** -0.047** -0.091*** 0.015 0.012 0.027 0.026** -0.017 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008 0.030** 0.044***
age40_44 0.022*** 0.016 -0.007 -0.012 0.067*** 0.043** 0.069*** 0.032* 0.065*** 0.038* 0.032** 0.029*** 0.041***
age45_49 0.079*** 0.011 0.083*** -0.003 0.084*** 0.077*** 0.053*** 0.089*** 0.040*** 0.068*** 0.094*** 0.022** 0.041***
age50_54 0.116*** -0.030 0.180*** -0.050** 0.101*** 0.050** 0.046*** 0.112*** 0.039*** 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.023** 0.018
age55_60 0.150*** -0.040** 0.264*** -0.031 0.106*** 0.008 0.057*** 0.138*** 0.013 0.095*** 0.074*** -0.025* 0.026
edL -0.141*** -0.119*** -0.194*** -0.206*** -0.135*** -0.112*** -0.181*** -0.374*** -0.241*** -0.023 -0.248*** -0.207*** -0.200***
edS -0.004 -0.033** -0.014 -0.075*** -0.054*** 0.006 -0.035*** -0.062*** -0.049*** -0.017 -0.058*** -0.001 -0.008
edH 0.144*** 0.152*** 0.208*** 0.281*** 0.190*** 0.106*** 0.216*** 0.436*** 0.290*** 0.040** 0.305*** 0.208*** 0.208***
female -0.072*** -0.189*** -0.081*** -0.169*** -0.068*** -0.101*** -0.119*** -0.121*** -0.094*** -0.107*** -0.075*** -0.123*** -0.089***
male 0.072*** 0.189*** 0.081*** 0.169*** 0.068*** 0.101*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.094*** 0.107*** 0.075*** 0.123*** 0.089***
temporary -0.116*** -0.046* -0.103*** -0.056* -0.057*** -0.065*** -0.096*** -0.078*** -0.071*** -0.136*** -0.097*** -0.049*** na
permanent 0.116*** 0.046* 0.103*** 0.056* 0.057*** 0.065*** 0.096*** 0.078*** 0.071*** 0.136*** 0.097*** 0.049*** na
occup_d -0.186*** -0.237*** -0.286*** -0.225*** -0.154*** -0.081*** -0.197*** -0.182*** -0.200*** -0.193*** -0.234*** -0.128*** -0.221***
occup_c -0.089*** -0.256*** -0.153*** -0.213*** -0.080*** -0.098*** -0.208*** -0.083*** -0.210*** -0.154*** -0.120*** -0.134*** -0.123***
occup_b 0.035*** 0.167*** 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.056*** 0.050*** 0.120*** 0.193*** 0.096*** 0.024 0.086*** 0.050*** 0.102***
occup_a 0.241*** 0.327*** 0.291*** 0.293*** 0.178*** 0.129*** 0.285*** 0.072 0.314*** 0.323*** 0.268*** 0.212*** 0.242***
Constant 2.534*** 1.017*** 3.061*** 1.198*** 2.986*** 3.036*** 1.216*** 2.048*** 0.582*** 2.779*** 1.993*** 1.053*** 2.866***
Observations 10,219 3,575 2,912 3,726 2,485 2,128 8,586 2,777 4,588 2,493 3,365 5,521 4,439


















Table 7 Decompositions for subsamples of younger and older employees (aged 25-44, 45-60) with pay gap rows bolded
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
FULL SAMPLE
public 2.847*** 2.842*** 0.428*** 2.538*** 1.539*** 2.829*** 3.211*** 1.399*** 2.536*** 2.933*** 2.507*** 1.389*** 3.180*** 3.235***
private 2.753*** 2.839*** 0.311*** 2.242*** 1.333*** 2.794*** 3.162*** 1.266*** 2.253*** 2.805*** 2.173*** 1.098*** 3.023*** 3.082***
difference 0.095*** 0.004 0.117*** 0.296*** 0.206*** 0.034*** 0.049** 0.133*** 0.283*** 0.128*** 0.334*** 0.291*** 0.157*** 0.153***
explained 0.092*** 0.036*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.001 0.111*** 0.151*** 0.115*** 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.061*** 0.066***
pub. adv. 0.003 -0.028** 0.027 0.176*** 0.108*** -0.045*** 0.046** 0.020 0.115*** 0.012 0.159*** 0.143*** 0.081*** 0.078**
pri. disadv. 0.000 -0.005** 0.002 0.023*** 0.007*** -0.007*** 0.002** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.008**
Obs. 2,963 3,224 3,031 2,862 8,484 6,559 4,551 4,011 8,601 3,453 3,104 5,943 1,965 1,083
OLDER
public 2.931*** 2.917*** 0.383*** 2.777*** 1.535*** 2.891*** 3.274*** 1.321*** 2.619*** 2.982*** 2.682*** 1.364*** 3.255*** 3.270***
private 2.810*** 2.941*** 0.310*** 2.362*** 1.315*** 2.844*** 3.191*** 1.185*** 2.365*** 2.843*** 2.359*** 1.106*** 3.103*** 3.131***
difference 0.121*** -0.025 0.073 0.415*** 0.220*** 0.047*** 0.083** 0.136*** 0.254*** 0.139*** 0.323*** 0.258*** 0.152*** 0.138**
explained 0.103*** 0.010 0.074** 0.173*** 0.097*** 0.105*** 0.030* 0.109*** 0.153*** 0.113*** 0.161*** 0.110*** 0.052** 0.052
pub. adv. 0.016 -0.028 -0.001 0.213*** 0.116*** -0.049*** 0.051* 0.025 0.084*** 0.024 0.131*** 0.135*** 0.081*** 0.077*
pri. disadv. 0.002 -0.006 -0.000 0.029*** 0.007*** -0.009*** 0.002* 0.002 0.017*** 0.002 0.031*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.010
Obs. 1,207 1,096 1,389 1,194 3,736 3,167 2,202 1,892 3,213 1,688 1,032 2,367 879 477
YOUNGER
public 2.766*** 2.784*** 0.464*** 2.358*** 1.542*** 2.753*** 3.149*** 1.470*** 2.456*** 2.876*** 2.396*** 1.404*** 3.077*** 3.198***
private 2.715*** 2.789*** 0.313*** 2.156*** 1.346*** 2.750*** 3.135*** 1.338*** 2.191*** 2.768*** 2.084*** 1.094*** 2.964*** 3.045***
difference 0.051 -0.005 0.151*** 0.202*** 0.195*** 0.003 0.014 0.132*** 0.265*** 0.108*** 0.312*** 0.311*** 0.113*** 0.152**
explained 0.048*** 0.013 0.100*** 0.047* 0.084*** 0.043*** -0.017 0.125*** 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.084*** 0.141*** -0.015 0.066**
pub. adv. 0.003 -0.016 0.046 0.138*** 0.105*** -0.035** 0.029 0.007 0.159*** 0.015 0.194*** 0.153*** 0.113*** 0.080
pri. disadv. 0.000 -0.002 0.004 0.018*** 0.007*** -0.005** 0.001 0.000 0.018*** 0.001 0.034*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.007


















Table 7 Decompositions for subsamples of younger and older employees (aged 25-44, 45-60) with pay gap rows bolded (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
FULL SAMPLE
public 2.719*** 1.221*** 3.297*** 1.486*** 3.227*** 3.171*** 1.451*** 2.047*** 0.814*** 2.928*** 2.235*** 1.185*** 3.007***
private 2.489*** 1.062*** 2.962*** 1.106*** 3.092*** 3.200*** 1.178*** 1.770*** 0.520*** 2.858*** 2.009*** 1.043*** 2.909***
difference 0.230*** 0.159*** 0.335*** 0.380*** 0.134*** -0.029 0.273*** 0.277*** 0.294*** 0.070* 0.226*** 0.142*** 0.098***
explained 0.143*** 0.142*** 0.106*** 0.241*** 0.070*** 0.044*** 0.210*** 0.124*** 0.184*** 0.042* 0.225*** 0.063*** 0.001
pub. adv. 0.077*** 0.015 0.212*** 0.124*** 0.056*** -0.069*** 0.058*** 0.135*** 0.104*** 0.027 0.001 0.068*** 0.086***
pri. disadv. 0.010*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.008*** -0.004*** 0.005*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.011*** 0.011***
Obs. 10,219 3,575 2,912 3,726 2,485 2,128 8,586 2,777 4,588 2,493 3,365 5,521 4,439
OLDER
public 2.758*** 1.215*** 3.481*** 1.369*** 3.294*** 3.145*** 1.512*** 2.086*** 0.749*** 2.934*** 2.354*** 1.199*** 3.016***
private 2.607*** 1.061*** 3.203*** 1.063*** 3.179*** 3.255*** 1.222*** 1.860*** 0.571*** 2.940*** 2.076*** 1.039*** 2.904***
difference 0.151*** 0.154*** 0.278*** 0.305*** 0.115*** -0.110*** 0.291*** 0.226*** 0.178*** -0.007 0.278*** 0.161*** 0.112***
explained 0.100*** 0.156*** 0.084* 0.191*** 0.081*** -0.004 0.202*** 0.035 0.106** 0.109*** 0.331*** 0.056*** 0.019
pub. adv. 0.043*** -0.002 0.177*** 0.103*** 0.029 -0.099*** 0.082*** 0.164*** 0.068 -0.111*** -0.048* 0.089*** 0.082***
pri. disadv. 0.008*** -0.000 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.005 -0.007*** 0.007*** 0.027*** 0.004 -0.005*** -0.004* 0.016*** 0.011***
Obs. 3,989 1,842 805 1,715 1,012 867 3,294 1,185 1,730 1,004 1,317 2,415 2,012
YOUNGER
public 2.678*** 1.226*** 3.207*** 1.583*** 3.162*** 3.193*** 1.419*** 2.001*** 0.852*** 2.925*** 2.156*** 1.172*** 2.999***
private 2.419*** 1.063*** 2.872*** 1.143*** 3.036*** 3.162*** 1.150*** 1.707*** 0.489*** 2.801*** 1.966*** 1.046*** 2.913***
difference 0.260*** 0.164*** 0.335*** 0.440*** 0.127*** 0.031 0.269*** 0.294*** 0.363*** 0.125** 0.190*** 0.125*** 0.085***
explained 0.102*** 0.142*** 0.082*** 0.279*** 0.021 0.050** 0.209*** 0.135*** 0.227*** 0.019 0.152*** 0.070*** -0.022
pub. adv. 0.143*** 0.020 0.236*** 0.143*** 0.095*** -0.019 0.055*** 0.145*** 0.129*** 0.100** 0.035 0.048*** 0.096***
pri. disadv. 0.015*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.011*** -0.001 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.006** 0.003 0.007*** 0.011***


















Table 8 Decompositions for subsamples of tertiary and non-tertiary educated with pay gap rows bolded
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
FULL SAMPLE
public 2.847*** 2.842*** 0.428*** 2.538*** 1.539*** 2.829*** 3.211*** 1.399*** 2.536*** 2.933*** 2.507*** 1.389*** 3.180*** 3.235***
private 2.753*** 2.839*** 0.311*** 2.242*** 1.333*** 2.794*** 3.162*** 1.266*** 2.253*** 2.805*** 2.173*** 1.098*** 3.023*** 3.082***
difference 0.095*** 0.004 0.117*** 0.296*** 0.206*** 0.034*** 0.049** 0.133*** 0.283*** 0.128*** 0.334*** 0.291*** 0.157*** 0.153***
explained 0.092*** 0.036*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.001 0.111*** 0.151*** 0.115*** 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.061*** 0.066***
pub. adv. 0.003 -0.028** 0.027 0.176*** 0.108*** -0.045*** 0.046** 0.020 0.115*** 0.012 0.159*** 0.143*** 0.081*** 0.078**
pri. disadv. 0.000 -0.005** 0.002 0.023*** 0.007*** -0.007*** 0.002** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.008**
Obs. 2,963 3,224 3,031 2,862 8,484 6,559 4,551 4,011 8,601 3,453 3,104 5,943 1,965 1,083
TERTIARY
public 3.014*** 2.936*** 0.731*** 2.600*** 1.733*** 2.894*** 3.310*** 1.550*** 2.668*** 2.999*** 2.579*** 1.734*** 3.289*** 3.291***
private 2.959*** 2.950*** 0.560*** 2.516*** 1.700*** 2.934*** 3.274*** 1.422*** 2.473*** 2.988*** 2.376*** 1.487*** 3.187*** 3.248***
difference 0.055 -0.014 0.171*** 0.084* 0.033 -0.039** 0.036 0.128*** 0.194*** 0.011 0.202*** 0.246*** 0.103*** 0.043
explained 0.051** 0.020 0.071*** 0.002 0.014 0.049*** 0.009 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.025 0.097*** 0.025* 0.031 0.037
pub. adv. 0.004 -0.029 0.087* 0.072*** 0.017 -0.074*** 0.026 0.031 0.089*** -0.012 0.084*** 0.191*** 0.061** 0.005
pri. disadv. 0.000 -0.004 0.013* 0.010*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.001 0.004 0.017*** -0.002 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.011** 0.001
Obs. 1,051 1,583 739 1,124 1,452 3,563 1,816 1,398 3,538 1,667 1,157 1,764 1,058 507
NON- TERTIARY
public 2.767*** 2.770*** 0.240*** 2.494*** 1.460*** 2.722*** 3.140*** 1.224*** 2.393*** 2.740*** 2.447*** 1.102*** 3.048*** 3.158***
private 2.638*** 2.727*** 0.237*** 2.066*** 1.261*** 2.637*** 3.088*** 1.187*** 2.109*** 2.647*** 2.060*** 0.946*** 2.834*** 2.944***
difference 0.129*** 0.043** 0.003 0.428*** 0.199*** 0.086*** 0.052** 0.037 0.284*** 0.093*** 0.388*** 0.156*** 0.214*** 0.214***
explained 0.115*** 0.066*** 0.004 0.139*** 0.052*** 0.076*** -0.003 0.026 0.105*** 0.022 0.119*** 0.045*** 0.062*** 0.015
pub. adv. 0.013 -0.020 -0.000 0.256*** 0.140*** 0.009 0.053** 0.010 0.160*** 0.068*** 0.230*** 0.103*** 0.130*** 0.184***
pri. disadv. 0.001 -0.004 -0.000 0.033*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.018*** 0.003*** 0.038*** 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.015***


















Table 8 Decompositions for subsamples of tertiary and non-tertiary educated with pay gap rows bolded (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
FULL SAMPLE
public 2.719*** 1.221*** 3.297*** 1.486*** 3.227*** 3.171*** 1.451*** 2.047*** 0.814*** 2.928*** 2.235*** 1.185*** 3.007***
private 2.489*** 1.062*** 2.962*** 1.106*** 3.092*** 3.200*** 1.178*** 1.770*** 0.520*** 2.858*** 2.009*** 1.043*** 2.909***
difference 0.230*** 0.159*** 0.335*** 0.380*** 0.134*** -0.029 0.273*** 0.277*** 0.294*** 0.070* 0.226*** 0.142*** 0.098***
explained 0.143*** 0.142*** 0.106*** 0.241*** 0.070*** 0.044*** 0.210*** 0.124*** 0.184*** 0.042* 0.225*** 0.063*** 0.001
pub. adv. 0.077*** 0.015 0.212*** 0.124*** 0.056*** -0.069*** 0.058*** 0.135*** 0.104*** 0.027 0.001 0.068*** 0.086***
pri. disadv. 0.010*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.008*** -0.004*** 0.005*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.011*** 0.011***
Obs. 10,219 3,575 2,912 3,726 2,485 2,128 8,586 2,777 4,588 2,493 3,365 5,521 4,439
TERTIARY
public 2.822*** 1.288*** 3.398*** 1.679*** 3.349*** 3.264*** 1.541*** 2.552*** 1.155*** 2.945*** 2.430*** 1.362*** 3.186***
private 2.707*** 1.170*** 3.329*** 1.458*** 3.278*** 3.284*** 1.492*** 2.564*** 0.944*** 2.939*** 2.436*** 1.311*** 3.119***
difference 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.069 0.222*** 0.071*** -0.020 0.048* -0.012 0.211*** 0.007 -0.006 0.050** 0.067**
explained 0.064*** 0.101*** -0.011 0.137*** 0.035** 0.052** 0.046*** 0.021 0.064*** 0.001 0.064*** -0.010 -0.038**
pub. adv. 0.043** 0.015 0.076 0.070** 0.031* -0.067** 0.002 -0.030 0.135*** 0.005 -0.060** 0.046*** 0.092***
pri. disadv. 0.008** 0.002 0.004 0.015** 0.005* -0.005** 0.000 -0.003 0.012*** 0.000 -0.010** 0.015*** 0.013***
Obs. 2,098 2,343 1,125 1,243 1,165 1,002 2,467 452 1,246 1,136 948 1,256 1,949
NON- TERTIARY
public 2.683*** 0.917*** 3.263*** 1.245*** 3.082*** 3.049*** 1.345*** 1.959*** 0.548*** 2.888*** 1.997*** 1.068*** 2.842***
private 2.435*** 0.868*** 2.721*** 0.950*** 2.935*** 3.126*** 1.065*** 1.614*** 0.369*** 2.793*** 1.859*** 0.976*** 2.748***
difference 0.248*** 0.048 0.542*** 0.295*** 0.147*** -0.078*** 0.280*** 0.345*** 0.179*** 0.095 0.139*** 0.093*** 0.094***
explained 0.138*** 0.054* 0.237*** 0.099*** 0.050*** -0.002 0.142*** 0.122*** 0.101*** 0.031 0.088*** -0.001 -0.006
pub. adv. 0.098*** -0.005 0.278*** 0.182*** 0.087*** -0.072*** 0.131*** 0.198*** 0.074** 0.062 0.049* 0.084*** 0.089***
pri. disadv. 0.012*** -0.000 0.027*** 0.014*** 0.010*** -0.004** 0.008*** 0.025*** 0.003** 0.002 0.002* 0.010*** 0.011***


















Table 9 Decompositions for subsamples of males and females with pay gap rows bolded
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
FULL SAMPLE
public 2.847*** 2.842*** 0.428*** 2.538*** 1.539*** 2.829*** 3.211*** 1.399*** 2.536*** 2.933*** 2.507*** 1.389*** 3.180*** 3.235***
private 2.753*** 2.839*** 0.311*** 2.242*** 1.333*** 2.794*** 3.162*** 1.266*** 2.253*** 2.805*** 2.173*** 1.098*** 3.023*** 3.082***
difference 0.095*** 0.004 0.117*** 0.296*** 0.206*** 0.034*** 0.049** 0.133*** 0.283*** 0.128*** 0.334*** 0.291*** 0.157*** 0.153***
explained 0.092*** 0.036*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.001 0.111*** 0.151*** 0.115*** 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.061*** 0.066***
pub. adv. 0.003 -0.028** 0.027 0.176*** 0.108*** -0.045*** 0.046** 0.020 0.115*** 0.012 0.159*** 0.143*** 0.081*** 0.078**
pri. disadv. 0.000 -0.005** 0.002 0.023*** 0.007*** -0.007*** 0.002** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.008**
Obs. 2,963 3,224 3,031 2,862 8,484 6,559 4,551 4,011 8,601 3,453 3,104 5,943 1,965 1,083
FEMALE
public 2.763*** 2.828*** 0.290*** 2.313*** 1.425*** 2.771*** 3.163*** 1.285*** 2.472*** 2.800*** 2.428*** 1.367*** 3.145*** 3.094***
private 2.634*** 2.787*** 0.192*** 2.056*** 1.192*** 2.680*** 3.058*** 1.083*** 2.195*** 2.700*** 2.084*** 1.046*** 2.953*** 3.006***
difference 0.129*** 0.041 0.098* 0.257*** 0.233*** 0.091*** 0.104*** 0.202*** 0.277*** 0.099*** 0.344*** 0.321*** 0.192*** 0.088
explained 0.060** 0.009 0.071*** 0.070 0.100*** 0.066*** -0.001 0.149*** 0.160*** 0.102*** 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.080*** 0.051*
pub. adv. 0.063** 0.027 0.026 0.170*** 0.125*** 0.021 0.100*** 0.049* 0.101*** -0.003 0.199*** 0.195*** 0.094*** 0.033
pri. disadv. 0.006* 0.005 0.002 0.018*** 0.009*** 0.004 0.005*** 0.004* 0.016*** -0.000 0.035*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.004
Obs. 941 1,087 1,467 1,332 3,858 2,124 2,125 2,072 3,498 1,681 1,219 2,894 771 477
MALE
public 2.880*** 2.851*** 0.533*** 2.674*** 1.647*** 2.861*** 3.264*** 1.550*** 2.585*** 3.056*** 2.552*** 1.412*** 3.207*** 3.354***
private 2.809*** 2.864*** 0.425*** 2.411*** 1.449*** 2.848*** 3.252*** 1.458*** 2.292*** 2.904*** 2.231*** 1.148*** 3.067*** 3.142***
difference 0.071** -0.013 0.108** 0.263*** 0.199*** 0.013 0.012 0.092** 0.292*** 0.152*** 0.320*** 0.264*** 0.140*** 0.212***
explained 0.096*** 0.056*** 0.063*** 0.041* 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.027* 0.078*** 0.148*** 0.119*** 0.154*** 0.162*** 0.072*** 0.086**
pub. adv. -0.023 -0.059*** 0.041 0.192*** 0.088*** -0.083*** -0.015 0.014 0.126*** 0.031 0.138*** 0.092*** 0.058** 0.115**
pri. disadv. -0.002 -0.009*** 0.004 0.030*** 0.005*** -0.013*** -0.001 0.001 0.017*** 0.002 0.029*** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.012**


















Table 9 Decompositions for subsamples of males and females with pay gap rows bolded (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
FULL SAMPLE
public 2.719*** 1.221*** 3.297*** 1.486*** 3.227*** 3.171*** 1.451*** 2.047*** 0.814*** 2.928*** 2.235*** 1.185*** 3.007***
private 2.489*** 1.062*** 2.962*** 1.106*** 3.092*** 3.200*** 1.178*** 1.770*** 0.520*** 2.858*** 2.009*** 1.043*** 2.909***
difference 0.230*** 0.159*** 0.335*** 0.380*** 0.134*** -0.029 0.273*** 0.277*** 0.294*** 0.070* 0.226*** 0.142*** 0.098***
explained 0.143*** 0.142*** 0.106*** 0.241*** 0.070*** 0.044*** 0.210*** 0.124*** 0.184*** 0.042* 0.225*** 0.063*** 0.001
pub. adv. 0.077*** 0.015 0.212*** 0.124*** 0.056*** -0.069*** 0.058*** 0.135*** 0.104*** 0.027 0.001 0.068*** 0.086***
pri. disadv. 0.010*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.008*** -0.004*** 0.005*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.011*** 0.011***
Obs. 10,219 3,575 2,912 3,726 2,485 2,128 8,586 2,777 4,588 2,493 3,365 5,521 4,439
FEMALE
public 2.659*** 1.170*** 3.163*** 1.467*** 3.111*** 3.060*** 1.363*** 1.971*** 0.688*** 2.764*** 2.201*** 1.099*** 2.941***
private 2.444*** 0.935*** 2.873*** 1.012*** 3.010*** 3.085*** 1.112*** 1.718*** 0.441*** 2.750*** 1.982*** 0.927*** 2.812***
difference 0.215*** 0.235*** 0.290*** 0.455*** 0.101*** -0.025 0.251*** 0.253*** 0.247*** 0.014 0.219*** 0.172*** 0.129***
explained 0.131*** 0.141*** 0.035 0.267*** 0.010 0.039** 0.206*** 0.094** 0.132*** -0.055** 0.187*** 0.100*** 0.007
pub. adv. 0.075*** 0.086** 0.241*** 0.167*** 0.079*** -0.060* 0.041** 0.144*** 0.111** 0.065 0.029 0.059*** 0.104***
pri. disadv. 0.010*** 0.008** 0.013*** 0.021*** 0.012*** -0.005* 0.005** 0.015*** 0.005** 0.004 0.003 0.013*** 0.018***
Obs. 3,614 1,832 922 1,984 535 834 3,811 1,297 2,045 1,049 1,685 2,700 1,816
MALE
public 2.749*** 1.275*** 3.336*** 1.510*** 3.264*** 3.277*** 1.553*** 2.099*** 0.879*** 3.049*** 2.275*** 1.327*** 3.081***
private 2.514*** 1.195*** 3.005*** 1.212*** 3.115*** 3.272*** 1.229*** 1.818*** 0.585*** 2.936*** 2.035*** 1.145*** 2.972***
difference 0.235*** 0.079* 0.331*** 0.299*** 0.149*** 0.006 0.324*** 0.281*** 0.294*** 0.113** 0.240*** 0.182*** 0.109***
explained 0.143*** 0.127*** 0.104*** 0.219*** 0.098*** 0.089*** 0.244*** 0.137*** 0.180*** 0.117*** 0.268*** 0.099*** 0.034*
pub. adv. 0.081*** -0.044 0.209*** 0.072* 0.045*** -0.079*** 0.074*** 0.126*** 0.107*** -0.004 -0.027 0.075*** 0.067***
pri. disadv. 0.011*** -0.004 0.019*** 0.008* 0.006*** -0.004*** 0.006*** 0.018*** 0.007*** -0.000 -0.002 0.008*** 0.007***


















Table 10 Decompositions for clerks only with pay gap rows bolded
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
FULL SAMPLE
public 2.847*** 2.842*** 0.428*** 2.538*** 1.539*** 2.829*** 3.211*** 1.399*** 2.536*** 2.933*** 2.507*** 1.389*** 3.180*** 3.235***
private 2.753*** 2.839*** 0.311*** 2.242*** 1.333*** 2.794*** 3.162*** 1.266*** 2.253*** 2.805*** 2.173*** 1.098*** 3.023*** 3.082***
difference 0.095*** 0.004 0.117*** 0.296*** 0.206*** 0.034*** 0.049** 0.133*** 0.283*** 0.128*** 0.334*** 0.291*** 0.157*** 0.153***
explained 0.092*** 0.036*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.001 0.111*** 0.151*** 0.115*** 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.061*** 0.066***
pub. adv. 0.003 -0.028** 0.027 0.176*** 0.108*** -0.045*** 0.046** 0.020 0.115*** 0.012 0.159*** 0.143*** 0.081*** 0.078**
pri. disadv. 0.000 -0.005** 0.002 0.023*** 0.007*** -0.007*** 0.002** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.008**
Obs. 2,963 3,224 3,031 2,862 8,484 6,559 4,551 4,011 8,601 3,453 3,104 5,943 1,965 1,083
CLERKS
public 2.813*** 2.780*** 0.262*** 2.233*** 1.404*** 2.725*** 3.026*** 1.026*** 2.414*** 2.635*** 2.498*** 1.251*** 2.977*** 2.814***
private 2.789*** 2.804*** 0.298*** 2.131*** 1.304*** 2.770*** 3.042*** 1.077*** 2.277*** 2.635*** 2.240*** 1.091*** 2.863*** 2.946***
difference 0.025 -0.023 -0.036 0.103** 0.100*** -0.045 -0.016 -0.051 0.136*** 0.000 0.259*** 0.160*** 0.114*** -0.132
explained 0.028 0.028** -0.009 -0.004 0.018 0.015 -0.055*** -0.054 0.059*** -0.001 0.095*** -0.013 0.043** -0.046
pub. adv. -0.003 -0.042* -0.023 0.091*** 0.071** -0.056 0.037 0.002 0.062*** 0.001 0.123*** 0.153*** 0.054* -0.077
pri. disadv. -0.001 -0.010* -0.003 0.016*** 0.011** -0.005 0.003 0.000 0.016*** 0.000 0.040*** 0.019*** 0.016* -0.009*


















Table 10 Decompositions for clerks only with pay gap rows bolded (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
FULL SAMPLE
public 2.719*** 1.221*** 3.297*** 1.486*** 3.227*** 3.171*** 1.451*** 2.047*** 0.814*** 2.928*** 2.235*** 1.185*** 3.007***
private 2.489*** 1.062*** 2.962*** 1.106*** 3.092*** 3.200*** 1.178*** 1.770*** 0.520*** 2.858*** 2.009*** 1.043*** 2.909***
difference 0.230*** 0.159*** 0.335*** 0.380*** 0.134*** -0.029 0.273*** 0.277*** 0.294*** 0.070* 0.226*** 0.142*** 0.098***
explained 0.143*** 0.142*** 0.106*** 0.241*** 0.070*** 0.044*** 0.210*** 0.124*** 0.184*** 0.042* 0.225*** 0.063*** 0.001
pub. adv. 0.077*** 0.015 0.212*** 0.124*** 0.056*** -0.069*** 0.058*** 0.135*** 0.104*** 0.027 0.001 0.068*** 0.086***
pri. disadv. 0.010*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.008*** -0.004*** 0.005*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.011*** 0.011***
Obs. 10,219 3,575 2,912 3,726 2,485 2,128 8,586 2,777 4,588 2,493 3,365 5,521 4,439
CLERKS
public 2.632*** 1.050*** 3.171*** 1.280*** 3.061*** 3.006*** 1.225*** 1.982*** 0.576*** 2.701*** 1.984*** 1.063*** 2.812***
private 2.543*** 1.017*** 2.970*** 1.088*** 2.944*** 3.094*** 1.169*** 1.829*** 0.560*** 2.725*** 2.005*** 1.001*** 2.736***
difference 0.090*** 0.033 0.201* 0.193* 0.117*** -0.088 0.056 0.153** 0.016 -0.024 -0.021 0.062* 0.076
explained 0.087*** -0.026 -0.044 -0.027 0.040 -0.015 0.015 0.049 0.019 0.004 0.012 -0.001 0.021
pub. adv. 0.002 0.052 0.222*** 0.203* 0.063** -0.065 0.035 0.091 -0.003 -0.027 -0.029 0.046** 0.045
pri. disadv. 0.000 0.008 0.023** 0.017* 0.014** -0.008 0.005 0.012 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004 0.018** 0.010


















Table 11 OLS regressions for monthly wage equations with the row for Public bolded
Variables AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
public 0.006 -0.034*** -0.000 0.083*** 0.050*** -0.037*** 0.028*** 0.011 0.036*** -0.002 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.033*** 0.051**
other -0.006 0.034*** 0.000 -0.083*** -0.050*** 0.037*** -0.028*** -0.011 -0.036*** 0.002 -0.081*** -0.077*** -0.033*** -0.051**
age25_29 -0.205*** -0.215*** -0.004 -0.276*** -0.048*** -0.221*** -0.197*** 0.078*** -0.181*** -0.120*** -0.341*** -0.125*** -0.289*** -0.193***
age30_34 -0.062*** -0.109*** -0.001 -0.108*** 0.022** -0.067*** -0.042*** 0.096*** -0.109*** -0.058*** -0.173*** -0.011 -0.149*** -0.097***
age35_39 -0.016 -0.012 0.031 -0.053*** 0.035*** 0.023** 0.026** 0.049*** -0.010 -0.031** -0.043*** 0.032** 0.027 0.011
age40_44 -0.010 0.051*** 0.007 0.040** 0.010 0.036*** 0.057*** 0.038** 0.025*** 0.020 0.059*** 0.023* 0.074*** 0.052*
age45_49 0.063*** 0.082*** 0.024 0.072*** 0.024** 0.079*** 0.077*** -0.015 0.064*** 0.043*** 0.150*** -0.000 0.142*** 0.085***
age50_54 0.072*** 0.092*** -0.019 0.157*** -0.005 0.098*** 0.044*** -0.055*** 0.099*** 0.064*** 0.184*** 0.057*** 0.084*** 0.074***
age55_60 0.156*** 0.112*** -0.039* 0.168*** -0.038*** 0.051*** 0.035*** -0.192*** 0.111*** 0.083*** 0.163*** 0.025 0.112*** 0.068**
edL -0.211*** -0.119*** -0.152*** -0.101*** -0.220*** -0.097*** -0.072*** -0.150*** -0.133*** -0.112*** -0.144*** -0.234*** -0.160*** -0.117***
edS 0.003 -0.017** -0.042*** -0.051*** -0.027*** -0.041*** -0.006 -0.013 -0.006 -0.032*** -0.017* -0.063*** -0.023 -0.015
edH 0.208*** 0.135*** 0.195*** 0.152*** 0.247*** 0.139*** 0.078*** 0.163*** 0.139*** 0.144*** 0.162*** 0.297*** 0.183*** 0.132***
female -0.126*** -0.068*** -0.152*** -0.188*** -0.164*** -0.127*** -0.125*** -0.220*** -0.103*** -0.127*** -0.134*** -0.100*** -0.107*** -0.154***
male 0.126*** 0.068*** 0.152*** 0.188*** 0.164*** 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.220*** 0.103*** 0.127*** 0.134*** 0.100*** 0.107*** 0.154***
temporary -0.070*** -0.057*** -0.064*** -0.274*** -0.028*** -0.107*** na -0.022 -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.074*** -0.078*** -0.024 -0.091**
permanent 0.070*** 0.057*** 0.064*** 0.274*** 0.028*** 0.107*** na 0.022 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.024 0.091**
occup_d -0.223*** -0.175*** -0.103*** -0.370*** -0.189*** -0.257*** -0.161*** -0.142*** -0.198*** -0.186*** -0.217*** -0.205*** -0.188*** -0.117***
occup_c -0.081*** -0.101*** -0.149*** -0.190*** -0.136*** -0.100*** -0.146*** -0.230*** -0.154*** -0.188*** -0.131*** -0.172*** -0.174*** -0.145***
occup_b 0.085*** 0.009 0.022 0.113*** 0.041*** 0.090*** 0.047*** 0.125*** 0.083*** 0.011 0.020 0.074*** 0.143*** 0.075***
occup_a 0.219*** 0.268*** 0.230*** 0.447*** 0.284*** 0.267*** 0.259*** 0.247*** 0.269*** 0.363*** 0.327*** 0.303*** 0.219*** 0.186***
Constant 7.827*** 7.893*** 5.495*** 7.353*** 6.593*** 7.769*** 8.249*** 6.411*** 7.480*** 7.838*** 7.481*** 6.320*** 8.083*** 8.257***
Observations 2,963 3,224 3,031 2,862 8,484 6,559 4,551 4,011 8,601 3,453 3,104 5,943 1,965 1,083


















Table 11 OLS regressions for monthly wage equations with the row for Public bolded (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
public 0.016*** 0.013 0.102*** 0.065*** 0.015** -0.052*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.046*** 0.015 -0.005 0.029*** 0.039***
other -0.016*** -0.013 -0.102*** -0.065*** -0.015** 0.052*** -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.046*** -0.015 0.005 -0.029*** -0.039***
age25_29 -0.192*** 0.013 -0.247*** 0.022 -0.255*** -0.131*** -0.156*** -0.230*** -0.121*** -0.173*** -0.155*** -0.041*** -0.171***
age30_34 -0.099*** 0.077*** -0.169*** 0.065*** -0.099*** -0.069*** -0.081*** -0.108*** -0.015 -0.107*** -0.105*** -0.025* 0.001
age35_39 -0.033*** -0.045** -0.088*** 0.023 0.015 0.031 0.035*** -0.004 0.005 -0.004 -0.009 0.035*** 0.052***
age40_44 0.022*** 0.016 -0.008 -0.006 0.064*** 0.051** 0.065*** 0.036* 0.061*** 0.038* 0.032** 0.025** 0.047***
age45_49 0.076*** 0.013 0.079*** -0.009 0.079*** 0.073*** 0.051*** 0.084*** 0.033** 0.068*** 0.094*** 0.018* 0.037**
age50_54 0.101*** -0.028 0.170*** -0.047** 0.091*** 0.047** 0.034*** 0.098*** 0.033** 0.083*** 0.079*** 0.021* 0.007
age55_60 0.124*** -0.044** 0.262*** -0.049** 0.105*** -0.002 0.052*** 0.123*** 0.005 0.095*** 0.065*** -0.033** 0.027
edL -0.137*** -0.121*** -0.212*** -0.206*** -0.135*** -0.105*** -0.171*** -0.350*** -0.231*** -0.023 -0.242*** -0.206*** -0.210***
edS -0.008 -0.030* -0.022** -0.069*** -0.055*** 0.001 -0.032*** -0.056*** -0.045*** -0.017 -0.061*** 0.004 -0.016
edH 0.144*** 0.151*** 0.234*** 0.276*** 0.190*** 0.104*** 0.203*** 0.407*** 0.277*** 0.039** 0.303*** 0.202*** 0.226***
female -0.105*** -0.196*** -0.096*** -0.186*** -0.081*** -0.131*** -0.140*** -0.144*** -0.104*** -0.107*** -0.086*** -0.144*** -0.122***
male 0.105*** 0.196*** 0.096*** 0.186*** 0.081*** 0.131*** 0.140*** 0.144*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.086*** 0.144*** 0.122***
temporary -0.121*** -0.024 -0.109*** -0.043 -0.058*** -0.075*** -0.085*** -0.072*** -0.063*** -0.134*** -0.100*** -0.044*** na
permanent 0.121*** 0.024 0.109*** 0.043 0.058*** 0.075*** 0.085*** 0.072*** 0.063*** 0.134*** 0.100*** 0.044*** na
occup_d -0.211*** -0.235*** -0.322*** -0.228*** -0.146*** -0.111*** -0.194*** -0.228*** -0.215*** -0.194*** -0.238*** -0.136*** -0.209***
occup_c -0.114*** -0.245*** -0.181*** -0.201*** -0.085*** -0.124*** -0.212*** -0.117*** -0.212*** -0.155*** -0.129*** -0.138*** -0.177***
occup_b 0.005 0.145*** 0.138*** 0.134*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.097*** 0.151*** 0.074*** 0.023 0.084*** 0.035*** 0.104***
occup_a 0.319*** 0.335*** 0.365*** 0.295*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.309*** 0.194*** 0.353*** 0.326*** 0.283*** 0.240*** 0.283***
Constant 7.648*** 6.176*** 8.237*** 6.377*** 8.056*** 8.140*** 6.391*** 7.168*** 5.752*** 7.800*** 7.148*** 6.205*** 8.035***
Observations 10,219 3,575 2,912 3,726 2,485 2,128 8,586 2,777 4,588 2,493 3,365 5,521 4,439
R-squared 0.303 0.276 0.574 0.291 0.396 0.219 0.289 0.498 0.382 0.206 0.450 0.293 0.327


















Table 12 Decomposition using monthly wage with pay gap rows bolded
AT BE BG CY CZ DE EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
MONTHLY WAGE
public 8.035*** 7.948*** 5.563*** 7.650*** 6.698*** 8.009*** 6.535*** 7.608*** 8.025*** 7.625*** 6.528*** 8.256*** 8.515***
private 7.920*** 7.978*** 5.479*** 7.387*** 6.508*** 7.994*** 6.407*** 7.405*** 7.919*** 7.335*** 6.247*** 8.149*** 8.356***
difference 0.115*** -0.030* 0.084** 0.264*** 0.191*** 0.016 0.128*** 0.203*** 0.106*** 0.290*** 0.281*** 0.107*** 0.158***
explained 0.104*** 0.034*** 0.085*** 0.106*** 0.095*** 0.087*** 0.107*** 0.135*** 0.111*** 0.140*** 0.134*** 0.044** 0.062**
pub. adv. 0.010 -0.055*** -0.000 0.139*** 0.090*** -0.061*** 0.020 0.059*** -0.004 0.126*** 0.134*** 0.053*** 0.087**
pri. disadv. 0.001 -0.009*** -0.000 0.018*** 0.006*** -0.010*** 0.001 0.009*** -0.000 0.025*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.009**
Obs. 2,963 3,224 3,031 2,862 8,484 6,559 4,011 8,601 3,453 3,104 5,943 1,965 1,083
HOURLY WAGE
public 2.847*** 2.842*** 0.428*** 2.538*** 1.539*** 2.829*** 1.399*** 2.536*** 2.933*** 2.507*** 1.389*** 3.180*** 3.235***
private 2.753*** 2.839*** 0.311*** 2.242*** 1.333*** 2.794*** 1.266*** 2.253*** 2.805*** 2.173*** 1.098*** 3.023*** 3.082***
difference 0.095*** 0.004 0.117*** 0.296*** 0.206*** 0.034*** 0.133*** 0.283*** 0.128*** 0.334*** 0.291*** 0.157*** 0.153***
explained 0.092*** 0.036*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.111*** 0.151*** 0.115*** 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.061*** 0.066***
pub. adv. 0.003 -0.028** 0.027 0.176*** 0.108*** -0.045*** 0.020 0.115*** 0.012 0.159*** 0.143*** 0.081*** 0.078**
pri. disadv. 0.000 -0.005** 0.002 0.023*** 0.007*** -0.007*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.001 0.031*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.008**


















Table 12 Decomposition using monthly wage with pay gap rows bolded (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK DK UK
MONTHLY WAGE
public 7.791*** 6.357*** 8.450*** 6.636*** 8.278*** 8.274*** 6.593*** 7.093*** 5.954*** 7.947*** 7.380*** 6.307*** 8.294*** 8.151***
private 7.626*** 6.193*** 8.154*** 6.279*** 8.187*** 8.329*** 6.350*** 6.907*** 5.681*** 7.877*** 7.167*** 6.200*** 8.239*** 8.099***
difference 0.164*** 0.165*** 0.296*** 0.356*** 0.091*** -0.056* 0.242*** 0.186*** 0.274*** 0.071* 0.213*** 0.108*** 0.054** 0.051**
explained 0.134*** 0.140*** 0.103*** 0.234*** 0.063*** 0.045** 0.189*** 0.120*** 0.184*** 0.042* 0.222*** 0.053*** -0.002 -0.024
pub. adv. 0.027*** 0.022 0.179*** 0.110*** 0.025** -0.095*** 0.049*** 0.059*** 0.085*** 0.027 -0.008 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.067***
pri. disadv. 0.004*** 0.002 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.003** -0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.001 -0.001 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.009***
Obs. 10,219 3,575 2,912 3,726 2,485 2,128 8,586 2,777 4,588 2,493 3,365 5,521 4,551 4,439
HOURLY WAGE
public 2.719*** 1.221*** 3.297*** 1.486*** 3.227*** 3.171*** 1.451*** 2.047*** 0.814*** 2.928*** 2.235*** 1.185*** 3.211*** 3.007***
private 2.489*** 1.062*** 2.962*** 1.106*** 3.092*** 3.200*** 1.178*** 1.770*** 0.520*** 2.858*** 2.009*** 1.043*** 3.162*** 2.909***
difference 0.230*** 0.159*** 0.335*** 0.380*** 0.134*** -0.029 0.273*** 0.277*** 0.294*** 0.070* 0.226*** 0.142*** 0.049** 0.098***
explained 0.143*** 0.142*** 0.106*** 0.241*** 0.070*** 0.044*** 0.210*** 0.124*** 0.184*** 0.042* 0.225*** 0.063*** 0.001 0.001
pub. adv. 0.077*** 0.015 0.212*** 0.124*** 0.056*** -0.069*** 0.058*** 0.135*** 0.104*** 0.027 0.001 0.068*** 0.046** 0.086***
pri. disadv. 0.010*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.008*** -0.004*** 0.005*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.000 0.011*** 0.002** 0.011***


















Table 13 Selection-corrected hourly wage equation with a dummy for Public (ML) and its row bolded
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
public 0.002 -0.017** 0.016 0.101*** 0.060*** -0.027*** 0.024** 0.016 0.069*** 0.009 0.102*** 0.079*** 0.059*** 0.044**
other -0.002 0.017** -0.016 -0.101*** -0.060*** 0.027*** -0.024** -0.016 -0.069*** -0.009 -0.102*** -0.079*** -0.059*** -0.044**
age25_29 -0.194*** -0.202*** -0.003 -0.274*** -0.044*** -0.210*** -0.199*** 0.054*** -0.202*** -0.123*** -0.345*** -0.172*** -0.269*** -0.187***
age30_34 -0.064*** -0.096*** -0.014 -0.128*** 0.025** -0.079*** -0.033** 0.077*** -0.135*** -0.071*** -0.177*** -0.061*** -0.147*** -0.101***
age35_39 -0.013 0.000 0.021 -0.089*** 0.033*** 0.018 0.023* 0.046** -0.020* -0.039** -0.063*** 0.014 0.020 0.023
age40_44 -0.004 0.060*** 0.008 0.020 0.000 0.038*** 0.054*** 0.041** 0.021** 0.030** 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.068*** 0.064**
age45_49 0.058*** 0.089*** 0.025 0.078*** 0.020** 0.084*** 0.065*** -0.010 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.135*** 0.029** 0.151*** 0.085***
age50_54 0.078*** 0.083*** -0.010 0.172*** -0.002 0.099*** 0.039*** -0.043** 0.112*** 0.078*** 0.198*** 0.099*** 0.091*** 0.043
age55_60 0.139*** 0.065** -0.026 0.220*** -0.032*** 0.049*** 0.051*** -0.165*** 0.158*** 0.055*** 0.198*** 0.046*** 0.086*** 0.072**
edL -0.209*** -0.131*** -0.145*** -0.056*** -0.206*** -0.112*** -0.068*** -0.204*** -0.109*** -0.150*** -0.134*** -0.369*** -0.248*** -0.140***
edS 0.007 -0.007 -0.051*** -0.070*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.004 -0.008 -0.009 -0.030*** -0.016 -0.029*** -0.001 -0.007
edH 0.202*** 0.139*** 0.197*** 0.126*** 0.235*** 0.144*** 0.071*** 0.212*** 0.118*** 0.180*** 0.150*** 0.398*** 0.249*** 0.147***
female -0.109*** -0.064*** -0.138*** -0.093*** -0.131*** -0.122*** -0.091*** -0.222*** -0.034*** -0.126*** -0.076*** -0.128*** -0.139*** -0.079***
male 0.109*** 0.064*** 0.138*** 0.093*** 0.131*** 0.122*** 0.091*** 0.222*** 0.034*** 0.126*** 0.076*** 0.128*** 0.139*** 0.079***
temporary -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.274*** -0.025*** -0.106*** na -0.039 -0.080*** -0.083*** -0.087*** -0.082*** -0.029 -0.110***
permanent 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.274*** 0.025*** 0.106*** na 0.039 0.080*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.029 0.110***
occup_d -0.188*** -0.137*** -0.097*** -0.326*** -0.162*** -0.223*** -0.123*** -0.137*** -0.177*** -0.170*** -0.208*** -0.174*** -0.168*** -0.114***
occup_c -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.153*** -0.176*** -0.119*** -0.087*** -0.122*** -0.218*** -0.134*** -0.158*** -0.124*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.098***
occup_b 0.100*** 0.029*** 0.037* 0.176*** 0.063*** 0.104*** 0.065*** 0.130*** 0.127*** 0.028*** 0.041** 0.078*** 0.157*** 0.069***
occup_a 0.153*** 0.172*** 0.212*** 0.326*** 0.219*** 0.206*** 0.181*** 0.226*** 0.184*** 0.300*** 0.291*** 0.246*** 0.161*** 0.143***
constant 2.634*** 2.701*** 0.350*** 2.278*** 1.423*** 2.532*** 3.169*** 1.163*** 2.418*** 2.637*** 2.367*** 0.983*** 2.812*** 2.987***
athrho 0.062 0.313 -0.105 -0.797*** -0.108 0.250*** -0.523*** 1.063*** -0.471*** 0.631*** -0.196 1.426*** 0.818*** -0.251
lnsigma -1.043*** -1.113*** -0.766*** -0.746*** -1.089*** -0.929*** -1.153*** -0.751*** -0.908*** -1.071*** -0.924*** -0.740*** -0.804*** -0.931***


















Table 13 Selection-corrected hourly wage equation with a dummy for Public (ML) and its row bolded (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
public 0.050*** 0.011 0.120*** 0.076*** 0.040*** -0.038*** 0.041*** 0.079*** 0.053*** 0.015 0.004 0.043*** 0.056***
other -0.050*** -0.011 -0.120*** -0.076*** -0.040*** 0.038*** -0.041*** -0.079*** -0.053*** -0.015 -0.004 -0.043*** -0.056***
age25_29 -0.220*** 0.021 -0.250*** 0.023 -0.220*** -0.157*** -0.176*** -0.238*** -0.139*** -0.174*** -0.188*** -0.037*** -0.174***
age30_34 -0.118*** 0.085*** -0.178*** 0.061** -0.084*** -0.095*** -0.083*** -0.135*** -0.034** -0.109*** -0.084*** -0.031** -0.013
age35_39 -0.030*** -0.044** -0.092*** 0.017 0.016 0.022 0.064*** -0.030 0.009 -0.003 0.041** 0.029** 0.023
age40_44 0.035*** 0.019 -0.007 -0.002 0.065*** 0.053*** 0.099*** 0.016 0.073*** 0.038* 0.069*** 0.028*** 0.044***
age45_49 0.092*** 0.011 0.082*** -0.006 0.083*** 0.088*** 0.077*** 0.089*** 0.049*** 0.068*** 0.117*** 0.019* 0.049***
age50_54 0.129*** -0.032 0.180*** -0.057** 0.090*** 0.067*** 0.046*** 0.116*** 0.043*** 0.084*** 0.061*** 0.020* 0.038**
age55_60 0.112*** -0.059*** 0.265*** -0.036 0.050*** 0.022 -0.028 0.181*** -0.000 0.095*** -0.016 -0.028** 0.033*
edL -0.187*** -0.213*** -0.193*** -0.256*** -0.170*** -0.134*** -0.320*** -0.337*** -0.347*** -0.027 -0.339*** -0.163*** -0.281***
edS 0.007 -0.012 -0.014 -0.069*** -0.050*** 0.009 -0.022** -0.065*** -0.028*** -0.016 -0.052*** -0.016 0.012
edH 0.180*** 0.225*** 0.207*** 0.324*** 0.220*** 0.126*** 0.342*** 0.403*** 0.375*** 0.043** 0.391*** 0.179*** 0.268***
female -0.139*** -0.203*** -0.080*** -0.183*** -0.140*** -0.128*** -0.187*** -0.083*** -0.138*** -0.108*** -0.105*** -0.118*** -0.143***
male 0.139*** 0.203*** 0.080*** 0.183*** 0.140*** 0.128*** 0.187*** 0.083*** 0.138*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.118*** 0.143***
temporary -0.118*** -0.051** -0.103*** -0.055* -0.057*** na -0.098*** -0.076*** -0.067*** -0.136*** -0.097*** -0.049*** na
permanent 0.118*** 0.051** 0.103*** 0.055* 0.057*** na 0.098*** 0.076*** 0.067*** 0.136*** 0.097*** 0.049*** na
occup_d -0.179*** -0.228*** -0.286*** -0.222*** -0.143*** -0.086*** -0.185*** -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.193*** -0.223*** -0.128*** -0.206***
occup_c -0.083*** -0.249*** -0.152*** -0.211*** -0.084*** -0.095*** -0.194*** -0.083*** -0.208*** -0.154*** -0.116*** -0.134*** -0.120***
occup_b 0.039*** 0.162*** 0.147*** 0.143*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.118*** 0.190*** 0.100*** 0.024 0.088*** 0.051*** 0.107***
occup_a 0.224*** 0.315*** 0.291*** 0.290*** 0.169*** 0.128*** 0.261*** 0.081 0.298*** 0.323*** 0.251*** 0.210*** 0.219***
constant 2.418*** 0.888*** 3.064*** 1.126*** 2.883*** 3.080*** 1.029*** 2.120*** 0.472*** 2.771*** 1.845*** 1.089*** 2.741***
athrho 0.668*** 0.839*** -0.019 0.438** 0.846*** 0.044 1.129*** -0.661*** 0.864*** 0.057 0.832*** -0.359** 1.163***
lnsigma -0.991*** -0.655*** -0.952*** -0.580*** -1.156*** -0.921*** -0.659*** -0.802*** -0.856*** -0.853*** -0.889*** -1.059*** -0.738***
Obs 10,209 3,574 2,910 3,721 2,485 4,025 8,553 2,773 4,579 2,493 3,327 5,506 4,435


















Table 14 Probit selection equation results (ML)
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
age30_34 -0.012 -0.044 0.217** -0.008 0.400*** 0.009 -0.066 0.218** -0.018 0.071 0.257*** 0.259*** -0.025 0.070
age35_39 0.142 -0.113 0.236** 0.089 0.648*** 0.093 0.143 0.284*** -0.150** 0.141* 0.386*** 0.348*** 0.114 0.492**
age40_44 0.286*** -0.087 0.222** 0.096 0.692*** 0.086 0.384*** 0.348*** -0.077 0.191** 0.337*** 0.444*** 0.212** 0.825***
age45_49 0.164 -0.191* 0.203** -0.005 0.661*** -0.067 0.264* 0.200** -0.102* 0.282*** 0.317*** 0.369*** 0.104 0.526**
age50_54 -0.028 -0.592*** 0.195* -0.120 0.570*** -0.255*** 0.159 0.160* -0.241*** 0.115 0.216** 0.446*** 0.018 0.321
age55_60 -0.632*** -1.088*** -0.104 -0.360*** 0.363*** -0.545*** -0.131 0.212** -0.573*** -0.302*** -0.293*** 0.324*** -0.204* 0.086
edS 0.584*** 0.571*** 1.118*** 0.604*** 0.711*** 0.542*** 0.302*** 0.330*** 0.565*** 0.305*** 0.351*** 0.738*** 0.706*** 0.143
edH 1.052*** 1.259*** 1.611*** 1.122*** 0.855*** 1.116*** 0.502*** 0.708*** 1.155*** 0.734*** 0.848*** 1.277*** 1.202*** 0.662***
male 1.483*** 1.138*** 0.487*** 1.349*** 0.916*** 1.233*** 0.660*** 0.421*** 1.222*** 0.539*** 1.484*** 0.631*** 1.112*** 1.079***
married -0.230*** 0.007 0.178*** 0.005 0.189*** 0.012 0.158** 0.041 -0.075** 0.027 -0.023 0.050 0.076 -0.218
childn -0.399*** -0.258*** 0.013 -0.123*** -0.294*** -0.317*** -0.281*** -0.100*** -0.058** -0.082*** -0.118*** -0.194*** -0.331*** -0.230**
exog inc -0.001 -0.006** -0.193*** -0.005* -0.014* -0.011*** -0.000 -0.043** 0.001 -0.003** -0.015** -0.005 -0.003 -0.003**
relativec 0.287*** 0.713*** 0.112 0.749*** 0.006 -0.145*** na 0.202** 0.876*** 0.555*** 0.971*** 0.157*** 1.006*** 5.290***
paidc -0.383*** 0.135 -0.559*** -0.118 -0.540*** -0.183*** 0.385*** -0.655*** -0.222*** -0.521*** -0.254*** -0.151*** 0.336*** 0.051
constant -0.085 -0.166* -0.425*** -0.009 -0.008 -0.302*** 0.959*** 0.537*** -0.088* 0.129 -0.558*** -0.388*** -0.718*** 0.529***


















Table 14 Probit selection equation results (ML) (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
age30_34 0.115** -0.053 -0.245** 0.076 -0.080 0.113 0.216*** -0.033 0.085 0.212* 0.372*** 0.161* 0.127
age35_39 0.296*** -0.164 -0.318*** -0.049 -0.171 0.409** 0.446*** -0.073 0.326*** 0.376*** 0.542*** 0.346*** 0.210**
age40_44 0.350*** -0.186 -0.319*** 0.068 -0.211 0.455*** 0.321*** -0.006 0.204** 0.197* 0.534*** 0.211** 0.309***
age45_49 0.374*** -0.254** -0.362*** -0.158* -0.276* 0.262 0.256*** -0.123 0.222** 0.080 0.475*** 0.236*** 0.233***
age50_54 0.343*** -0.265** -0.681*** -0.222** -0.571*** 0.074 0.059 -0.121 0.157* 0.168 0.190** 0.240*** 0.228**
age55_60 -0.130** -0.426*** -1.015*** -0.184* -1.139*** -0.070 -0.357*** -0.477*** -0.078 0.189 -0.320*** 0.222** 0.150*
edS 0.603*** 0.700*** 0.184*** 0.562*** 0.456*** 0.528*** 0.672*** 0.458*** 0.887*** 0.624*** 0.640*** 1.166*** 0.668***
edH 0.914*** 1.147*** 0.666*** 1.090*** 0.999*** 0.976*** 1.459*** 0.940*** 1.857*** 0.876*** 1.393*** 1.781*** 0.996***
male 1.364*** 0.333*** 1.492*** 0.434*** 2.055*** 0.943*** 0.929*** 0.867*** 0.997*** 0.536*** 0.514*** 0.430*** 0.956***
married -0.098*** 0.310*** -0.317*** 0.064 -0.533*** -0.059 0.173*** 0.207*** -0.130** 0.089 0.098** 0.160*** -0.044
childn -0.117*** -0.002 -0.360*** -0.021 -0.252*** -0.307*** -0.152*** -0.114* -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.021 -0.303*** -0.451***
exog inc -0.011*** 0.024 -0.001 -0.010 -0.017*** -0.001 -0.035*** -0.042*** -0.200*** -0.004 -0.021* -0.039 -0.004***
relativec 0.444*** 0.796*** 0.625*** 0.980*** 0.243*** 0.645 0.532*** 0.371*** 0.086 -0.280 0.429*** 0.361*** 0.396***
paidc -0.096** -0.490*** 0.384*** -0.894*** -0.211* 0.037 -0.279*** 0.410*** na 0.191* 0.133 0.047 0.371***
constant -0.652*** 0.162 0.560*** 0.329*** -0.016 0.903*** -0.592*** 0.264*** -0.261*** 0.120 -0.755*** -0.282*** -0.043


















Table 15 Decompositions of offered wage gap (adjusted for selection), with pay gap rows bolded
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
overall
public 2.847*** 2.842*** 0.428*** 2.538*** 1.539*** 2.829*** 3.211*** 1.399*** 2.537*** 2.933*** 2.507*** 1.389*** 3.180*** 3.235***
private 2.753*** 2.839*** 0.311*** 2.241*** 1.333*** 2.794*** 3.162*** 1.265*** 2.254*** 2.805*** 2.174*** 1.099*** 3.025*** 3.091***
difference 0.095*** 0.004 0.117*** 0.296*** 0.206*** 0.034*** 0.049** 0.133*** 0.283*** 0.128*** 0.333*** 0.291*** 0.155*** 0.144***
adjusted
public 2.832*** 2.820*** 0.377** 2.616*** 1.546*** 2.839*** 3.168*** 1.381*** 2.633*** 2.944*** 2.456*** 1.418*** 3.094*** 3.251***
private 2.750*** 2.845*** 0.339*** 2.347*** 1.334*** 2.755*** 3.221*** 1.255*** 2.312*** 2.773*** 2.187*** 1.079*** 2.996*** 3.108***
difference 0.082* -0.025 0.037 0.269*** 0.213*** 0.084*** -0.053 0.126** 0.321*** 0.171*** 0.269*** 0.339*** 0.099 0.143*
explained 0.092*** 0.035*** 0.082*** 0.069*** 0.091*** 0.086*** 0.009 0.112*** 0.145*** 0.119*** 0.143*** 0.135*** 0.058*** 0.060**
pub. adv. -0.009 -0.046 -0.041 0.176*** 0.114*** 0.001 -0.060 0.013 0.152*** 0.049 0.105*** 0.191*** 0.030 0.070
pri. disadv. -0.001 -0.014* -0.003 0.024*** 0.007*** -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.024*** 0.003 0.022** 0.013** 0.010 0.014**
Mills p-value 0.709 0.832 0.476 0.000 0.821 0.008 0.000 0.404 0.000 0.095 0.860 0.159 0.228 0.344


















Table 15 Decompositions of offered wage gap (adjusted for selection), with pay gap rows bolded (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
overall
public 2.719*** 1.221*** 3.297*** 1.486*** 3.227*** 3.169*** 1.452*** 2.047*** 0.814*** 2.928*** 2.235*** 1.186*** 3.009***
private 2.489*** 1.062*** 2.963*** 1.107*** 3.092*** 3.207*** 1.179*** 1.771*** 0.520*** 2.858*** 2.012*** 1.043*** 2.909***
difference 0.230*** 0.159*** 0.334*** 0.379*** 0.134*** -0.038 0.273*** 0.276*** 0.294*** 0.070* 0.223*** 0.143*** 0.099***
adjusted
public 2.687*** 1.310*** 3.319*** 1.450*** 3.230*** 3.119*** 1.449*** 2.069*** 0.851*** 2.884*** 2.334*** 1.168*** 2.943***
private 2.465*** 1.046*** 2.963*** 1.070*** 3.056*** 3.201*** 1.129*** 1.859*** 0.519*** 2.828*** 1.918*** 1.047*** 2.878***
difference 0.222*** 0.264*** 0.357*** 0.380*** 0.174*** -0.082 0.320*** 0.210** 0.332*** 0.056 0.416*** 0.121*** 0.065
explained 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.105*** 0.247*** 0.068*** 0.038** 0.218*** 0.119*** 0.185*** 0.046* 0.241*** 0.063*** -0.000
pub. adv. 0.066* 0.108 0.229*** 0.113 0.092*** -0.118** 0.094** 0.078 0.142** 0.005 0.159* 0.050 0.056
pri. disadv. 0.010* 0.013* 0.023*** 0.019** 0.014*** -0.002* 0.007* 0.013 0.005 0.005 0.016 0.009 0.009*
Mills p-value 0.114 0.867 0.692 0.254 0.001 0.485 0.002 0.005 0.898 0.532 0.027 0.867 0.003


















Table 16 Probit first-stage results in Heckman corrections
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI GR HU IE IS
age30_34 -0.014 -0.060 0.218** 0.029 0.405*** 0.002 -0.073 0.179* 0.006 0.076 0.270*** 0.257*** -0.034 0.057
age35_39 0.140 -0.144 0.238** 0.096 0.655*** 0.085 0.136 0.255*** -0.102* 0.120 0.412*** 0.365*** 0.026 0.470**
age40_44 0.282** -0.125 0.225** 0.075 0.694*** 0.075 0.396*** 0.248** -0.029 0.164* 0.353*** 0.403*** 0.154 0.840***
age45_49 0.161 -0.222** 0.208** -0.068 0.669*** -0.080 0.254* 0.101 -0.064 0.247*** 0.329*** 0.305*** 0.016 0.543**
age50_54 -0.029 -0.622*** 0.198* -0.225* 0.573*** -0.271*** 0.185 0.088 -0.211*** 0.067 0.234** 0.356*** -0.113 0.351
age55_60 -0.635*** -1.119*** -0.103 -0.483*** 0.366*** -0.561*** -0.114 0.184* -0.549*** -0.367*** -0.277*** 0.200** -0.336*** 0.131
edS 0.584*** 0.575*** 1.119*** 0.562*** 0.712*** 0.543*** 0.301*** 0.358*** 0.559*** 0.305*** 0.357*** 0.762*** 0.711*** 0.139
edH 1.053*** 1.255*** 1.606*** 0.925*** 0.854*** 1.117*** 0.477*** 0.735*** 1.121*** 0.725*** 0.846*** 1.161*** 1.202*** 0.660***
male 1.486*** 1.147*** 0.484*** 1.345*** 0.911*** 1.242*** 0.647*** 0.324*** 1.211*** 0.529*** 1.476*** 0.562*** 1.148*** 1.077***
married -0.233*** 0.018 0.173*** -0.021 0.184*** 0.026 0.153* 0.079 -0.112*** 0.086* -0.046 0.130*** 0.170*** -0.258**
childn -0.398*** -0.248*** 0.014 -0.200*** -0.298*** -0.311*** -0.251*** -0.132*** -0.085*** -0.093*** -0.130*** -0.281*** -0.373*** -0.204**
exoginc -0.001 -0.004 -0.199*** -0.005 -0.015** -0.008** 0.000 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003* -0.018*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003**
relativec 0.287*** 0.735*** 0.113 0.874*** -0.003 -0.131** na 0.250*** 0.919*** 0.638*** 0.972*** 0.201*** 1.051*** na
paidc -0.380*** 0.100 -0.557*** -0.124 -0.530*** -0.207*** 0.335*** -0.861*** -0.231*** -0.572*** -0.253*** -0.319*** 0.372*** 0.028
constant -0.083 -0.153* -0.422*** 0.162 -0.008 -0.306*** 0.975*** 0.647*** -0.066 0.154* -0.548*** -0.252*** -0.692*** 0.531***


















Table 16 Probit first-stage results in Heckman corrections (Continued)
IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
age30_34 0.102** -0.061 -0.244** 0.062 -0.150 0.114 0.164*** 0.013 0.052 0.210* 0.354*** 0.172** 0.052
age35_39 0.271*** -0.156 -0.317*** -0.066 -0.339** 0.411** 0.370*** -0.017 0.310*** 0.374*** 0.527*** 0.358*** 0.116
age40_44 0.312*** -0.227* -0.317*** 0.046 -0.410*** 0.453*** 0.243*** 0.015 0.195** 0.195* 0.489*** 0.231*** 0.212**
age45_49 0.325*** -0.298** -0.360*** -0.184** -0.494*** 0.259 0.172*** -0.139 0.180** 0.075 0.434*** 0.255*** 0.101
age50_54 0.310*** -0.323*** -0.679*** -0.239** -0.762*** 0.073 -0.020 -0.159 0.126 0.163 0.124 0.254*** 0.092
age55_60 -0.188*** -0.479*** -1.013*** -0.206** -1.348*** -0.072 -0.497*** -0.517*** -0.105 0.184 -0.377*** 0.232** -0.038
edS 0.613*** 0.679*** 0.184*** 0.567*** 0.486*** 0.527*** 0.669*** 0.435*** 0.896*** 0.625*** 0.637*** 1.169*** 0.697***
edH 0.890*** 1.124*** 0.666*** 1.089*** 1.025*** 0.973*** 1.453*** 0.869*** 1.837*** 0.874*** 1.327*** 1.781*** 1.030***
male 1.385*** 0.287*** 1.491*** 0.426*** 2.152*** 0.942*** 0.929*** 0.830*** 1.019*** 0.536*** 0.501*** 0.413*** 1.056***
married -0.073** 0.365*** -0.318*** 0.078 -0.571*** -0.057 0.259*** 0.230*** -0.104* 0.094 0.121*** 0.166*** 0.052
childn -0.129*** -0.033 -0.360*** -0.033 -0.282*** -0.306*** -0.176*** -0.192*** -0.251*** -0.210*** -0.068 -0.310*** -0.569***
exoginc -0.007*** 0.014 -0.002 -0.009 -0.013*** -0.001 -0.025** -0.041** -0.196*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.084 -0.004*
relativec 0.516*** 0.894*** 0.623*** 1.008*** 0.332*** 0.635 0.680*** 0.404*** 0.083 -0.270 0.451*** 0.337*** 0.402***
paidc -0.076* -0.608*** 0.385*** -0.908*** -0.174 0.030 -0.362*** 0.403*** na 0.185* 0.160* 0.074 0.641***
constant -0.653*** 0.216* 0.560*** 0.345*** 0.128 0.907*** -0.572*** 0.299*** -0.253*** 0.121 -0.711*** -0.288*** 0.031
Obs 15,598 4,071 3,809 4,472 3,730 4,188 11,071 3,495 5,652 2,859 4,892 6,136 5,333
Note: The small differences in the number of observations between Tables 14 and 16 in the Appendix arise because of differences in the manner in which the two Stata routines treat variables with very few


















Figure 14 OLS monthly vs hourly wage.
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